Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LEH)

Fundierte Speckulation. Warum sollte man sich mit dieser Angagieren, wo nicht mal eine Hoffnung besteht? Da kaufe ich lieber das Original und gehe nicht noch ein viel viel höheres Risiko ein als bei der WaMu.

Unlogisch was ihr hier macht.  

Wahrscheinlich hast Du diesen Thread erst seit ganz, ganz, ganz Kurzem besucht.
Sonst hättestu sowas gar nicht geschrieben...

Trotzdem ganz liebe Grüße:
Der olle Teras.

Securities and Exchange Commission investigators may issue a public rebuke of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LEHMQ) and its former executives instead of suing them for actions that led to the firm’s 2008 failure, three people with direct knowledge of the matter said.

SEC enforcement lawyers, who have struggled for more than two years to find definitive evidence that the company and its leaders violated securities laws, are concerned that a legal attack on Lehman’s accounting practices would likely fail, the people said, speaking on condition of anonymity because the deliberations aren’t public.

Instead, the enforcement staff may recommend that the agency take the rare step of publishing a so-called report of investigation, also known as a 21(a) report. The commission would have to vote on whether to issue a report and it’s still possible that the SEC may decide to bring legal claims in court, the people said. The 21(a) reports, which lay out allegations of misconduct without imposing penalties, have only been issued six times in the past decade, according to the SEC’s website.

“The SEC can claim that this is decisive action and that they’re on record as to the wrongdoing. It doesn’t meet the inevitable resistance that civil action meets -- the possibility of failure,” said Robert Hillman, a professor at the University of California, Davis, School of Law.

Kimberly Macleod, a spokesman for Lehman, declined to comment. Patricia Hynes, an attorney at Allen & Overy LLP for Lehman’s ex-chief executive officer Richard Fuld, and Robert Cleary, a lawyer at Proskauer Rose LLP for former finance chief Erin Callan, didn’t respond to e-mails. Florence Harmon, an SEC spokesman, declined to comment.

Valukas Report
Lehman, which filed the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history in September 2008, was faulted along with its former executives in a report by Anton Valukas, the court-appointed examiner, who said they misled investors with “accounting gimmicks.” Valukas alleged that Lehman used the technique, known as Repo 105s, to hide billions of dollars in assets and artificially reduce the firm’s leverage. The actions may not have violated accounting rules, making it difficult for the SEC to pursue fraud claims.

If the SEC determines it can’t bring a case, airing its findings may be the best option for fending off criticism from lawmakers and investors who say the agency hasn’t been aggressive in pursuing wrongdoing that fueled the financial crisis, Hillman said.

James Cox, a securities law professor at Duke University School of Law, said it would be “disappointing” if the SEC didn’t bring fraud charges against Lehman and its executives.

‘Least Harmful’
The rebuke is “about the least harmful sanction anybody could get,” Cox said.

Congress gave the SEC discretion to publicize findings of investigations in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The reports were meant to be a flexible tool to shine a spotlight on questionable conduct that may not support an enforcement action, said Steve Crimmins, a former SEC attorney who’s now a partner at K&L Gates LLP in Washington.

“It was adopted to help get the SEC where it needed to go when the path was not all that clear,” Crimmins said. “The reports tend to be used in borderline situations, where the SEC feels the need to speak out about the broader significance of something but for whatever reason feels it’s just not right to bring a case.”

While the agency continues to weigh the possibility of bringing civil fraud claims, it faces several hurdles, according to the people.

Rule Changes
In April, the Financial Accounting Standards Board changed its rule for how firms have to account for the short-term transactions that let Lehman temporarily remove about $50 billion in assets from its balance sheet by treating them as sales. FASB’s move may bolster the defense that the rule, not Lehman’s application of it, was faulty.

Since Lehman is defunct, any enforcement action would likely target individuals, such as Fuld and Callan, said Cox.

“The executives had to sign off that the financial statements fairly presented the firm’s financial position,” Cox said. “Even though the Repo 105s were perhaps in technical compliance with GAAP, they were distorting the true economic image of the firm.”

Ernst & Young LLP, Lehman’s auditor, was sued in December by then-New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, who’s now governor, for signing off on Lehman’s quarterly financial statements. The firm disputes the claims and hasn’t been accused of wrongdoing by federal regulators.

Ernst’s ‘Hindsight’
In a May statement, Ernst & Young said regulators have made “a series of changes to accounting and disclosure rules” since the financial crisis that, “with the benefit of hindsight, are significant improvements to the system that existed prior to Lehman’s demise.”

The SEC could also focus on whether Lehman’s executives deceived investors by falsely describing the treatments being used, two people said. In September, the SEC proposed a rule that would require companies to provide “a comprehensive explanation of short-term borrowings.” Defense lawyers could argue that the change shows that Lehman’s disclosures weren’t deficient under current rules.

In response to Valukas’s report, Ernst & Young said Lehman’s management discussion and analysis “were the responsibility of management, not the auditor.”

In testimony to Congress last year, Fuld said Lehman shouldn’t be criticized for complying with existing repo accounting rules. He also said he had “absolutely no recollection whatsoever” of hearing about the Repo 105s.

Regulatory Lapse
Defense lawyers for Lehman would likely try to turn any allegations by the SEC back on the agency. Referring to his interviews of executives, Valukas wrote that “a recurrent theme in their response was that Lehman gave full and complete financial information to government agencies” and that regulators “never raised significant objections or directed that Lehman take any corrective action.”

SEC examiners monitored Lehman’s financial health as part of the Consolidated Supervised Entities program, which had been set up in 2004 to guard against the collapse of systemically important investment banks. The voluntary program was halted after Lehman declared bankruptcy.

The commission issued two 21(a) reports last year. In August, the SEC published results from a probe of Moody’s Corp. (MCO) that found the company had chosen not to downgrade inflated ratings on almost $1 billion of debt in 2007 out of concern for the company’s reputation. The SEC said it didn’t pursue fraud claims because the conduct occurred in Europe, raising uncertainty as to whether the agency had jurisdiction.

Banks Warned
In March 2010 the agency posted details of a probe involving a JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) vice chairman, faulting him for raising money for former California Treasurer Phil Angelides. A JPMorgan subsidiary underwrote certain California bonds within two years of the donation, even though securities rules bar banks from doing so. The SEC used the report to reaffirm guidance on the rule, warning banks that it also applies to executives of parent bank holding companies.

The SEC has already made some public remarks about Lehman’s accounting. After Valukas released his findings, the SEC sent letters to financial firms in March 2010, asking for information on their use of repos as it sought to “better understand” their decisions. The agency hasn’t found evidence that “inappropriate practices were widespread,” Chief Accountant James Kroeker said at a May 2010 congressional hearing.

“So much of what went on here was neither clearly legal nor clearly illegal,” the University of California’s Hillman said. “It fell through the cracks in this case, and that makes civil actions very, very difficult. The 21(a) report would be an opportunity for the SEC and everyone else to move on.”

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-03/...ort-on-lehman-abuses.html  

BRENDAN TREMBATH: The local arm of the collapsed US investment bank, Lehman Brothers, says local councils knew the risks when they decided to buy millions of dollars worth of complex investment products.

Seventy-two local councils, churches and charities which suffered losses are suing the estate of Lehman Brothers for $250 million in the Federal Court. They bought collateralised debt obligations, risky products which were linked to the global financial crisis.

The legal team for Lehman Brothers has been presenting its closing arguments and denies misleading investors.

For more, I'm joined by finance reporter, Sue Lannin. Sue, what has Lehman Brothers legal team said?

SUE LANNIN: Well they've said that they did not mislead the councils and the other investors into buying collateralised debt obligations. John Sheahan SC, the barrister for the estate of Lehman Brothers, said that Lehman did tell investors of risks in presentations and documents and, in fact, they're alleging that the councils didn't take reasonable care.

Lehman Brothers is saying it gave adequate disclosure and, in fact, more information wouldn't have made a difference to the councils because they said they wanted to hold the products to maturity.

Now Lehman Brothers is also saying that the councils haven't proved their case and John Sheahan SC actually accused the plaintiffs, he said all they're doing is taking aim at people with money in a voyeuristic way, and saying we've been gipped.

Now, he also said that the councils and the other clients had been told about the ratings and that they understood the risk of default and, in fact, they'd admitted that during cross examination.

BRENDAN TREMBATH: Apparently the judge has taken issue with some of Lehman Brothers' arguments?

SUE LANNIN: Yes, now, the judge has taken issue with some of certainly Lehman Brothers' descriptions; it described itself as an equipment seller.

Now, that's because one of its arguments is that it wasn't actually an investment adviser to at least two of the councils, so the Parkes Shire Council in New South Wales and the Swan City Council in Western Australia, it said it was merely selling them products. So the judge took issue with that; Justice Rares was quite incredulous and said 'but you were selling the products and giving them investment advice'.

Also the judge says that Lehman did not tell the councils that it was in fact selling the collateralised, sorry buying, the collateralised debt obligations, from the issuer at a discount and then on-selling them to the councils at face value. And that, in fact, was Lehman's main way of generating profit; it was from underwriting these products.

So it actually bought them at a discount and made the profit from selling them at face value to the councils. And the judge basically said that Lehman wasn't taking on much underwriting risk because it had all these agreements in place with the councils where they agreed to buy the products.

BRENDAN TREMBATH: Fundamentally the issue was that many people were buying products that they didn't really understand and various people in financial markets were selling these products; what are the councils saying in this case?

SUE LANNIN: They're saying that they were misled, that they weren't told about the risks. They're saying that they weren't told that the collateralised debt obligations were linked to the subprime crisis.

And also what was happening was that Lehman was reselling the products, the CDOs between the councils, and that's also another issue that the councils are angry about. They feel that there was a lack of disclosure and if they'd known the real risks they wouldn't have bought the products.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-03/...ort-on-lehman-abuses.html  

Lehman Brothers is accusing Goldman Sachs of intentionally delaying turning over emails in a bankruptcy probe of whether a secret Wall Street campaign helped short sellers profit at Lehman’s expense from the investment bank’s implosion.


Getty ImagesIn a Tuesday filing with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan, Lehman said that despite agreeing last month to search for certain terms in emails from 37 proprietary trading-desk custodians, Goldman has only searched 11 custodians’ messages.

“Goldman Sachs is moving at a glacial pace in an effort to run out the statute of limitations without producing the requested documents,” Lehman said in its filing. Lehman is asking Judge James Peck to force Goldman to search the other 26 custodians’ inboxes within two weeks.

Goldman declined to comment.

Lehman is probing what it calls a Wall Street-wide campaign against the investment bank in the months ahead of its September 2008 collapse that garnered profits for naked short sellers, or investors that bet against a company’s stock without physically locating the shares. The Securities and Exchange Commission issued strict regulations against naked-shorting during the financial crisis, but regulators have typically had a difficult time enforcing those rules.

In the months and days before Lehman collapsed in September 2008, at the height of the financial crisis, the bank–particularly then-Chairman and Chief Executive Dick Fuld–repeatedly blamed much of the plunge in Lehman’s stock price on pressure created by rumors and short selling.

While the collapse of the bank has since been blamed much more on the diminished value of its assets, Lehman is still trying to assess how much of the losses can be attributed to the spreading of rumors.

Lehman initially subpoenaed Goldman last April, and while Goldman recently wavered over how many of the custodians’ emails it would search, the bank agreed last month that it would search terms on all 37 Lehman had named.

In its Tuesday court filing, Lehman said Goldman was also slow in providing organizational charts that would help Lehman in identifying the custodians that were most relevant. Lehman said its request is limited to a very specific set of terms used in emails over a four-month period.

“Given its enormous wealth and resources, Goldman Sachs clearly is not burdened by undertaking this modest production,” Lehman said in its filing. A hearing on the matter is set for June 15.

Lehman’s collapse in September 2008 marked the largest U.S. bankruptcy case ever filed. Since then, a team of hundreds of bankruptcy professionals under the direction of restructuring firm Alvarez & Marsal has managed Lehman’s assets–which include real-estate holdings, corporate debt and derivatives–for the benefit of creditors.

Lehman has filed an updated plan to distribute its assets, as have two other parties–one by a group of bondholders led by hedge-fund manager Paulson & Co.–and one by a group of creditors of Lehman’s so-called non-operating subsidiaries, led by Goldman and distressed investment manager Silver Point Capital LP.

Lehman estimated earlier this year that it will likely have $322 billion in allowed claims against the estate, with $272 billion from the parent company and about $50 billion from its various subsidiaries. The bank increased creditors’ expected net recovery by $2.6 billion from the $57.5 billion it estimated in a September court presentation.


http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/06/01/...f-withholding-lehman-emails/  

JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) and Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. settled a dispute over $222.3 million in claims on the defunct firm that the second-biggest U.S. bank inherited when it bought Washington Mutual Bank after Lehman’s September 2008 bankruptcy.

The settlement was disclosed in a court filing today. Details weren’t given.

The WaMu claims stemmed from a swap agreement it had with Lehman’s special-financing unit, according to proofs of claim filed by JPMorgan. The New York-based bank paid itself back for what was owing by taking collateral deposited with it by Lehman, according to the claim documents. Lehman had objected that $80 million of the collateral was part of a guarantee agreement that JPMorgan wasn’t entitled to draw on.

The settlement doesn’t affect Lehman’s ongoing $8.6 billion lawsuit against JPMorgan. JPMorgan, Lehman’s main clearing bank in the 2008 credit crisis, is trying to get the suit dismissed.

The two companies are due to present their agreement on the WaMu claims to a Manhattan bankruptcy judge tomorrow.

The bankruptcy case is In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LEHMQ), 08-13555, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan). The adversary case is Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase


http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-01/...llion-in-wamu-claims.html  

Lehman Brothers Holdings is proposing a wide-ranging settlement of its unresolved derivatives trades with more than a dozen of its largest counterparties - including some of Wall Street's biggest banks - in a move the investment bank says could help speed the resolution of its bankruptcy case.
In a framework announced on Tuesday, Lehman proposed a settlement with 13 of its largest derivatives counterparties, the 30 or so "big-bank counterparties." If accepted by the banks, the deal could erase billions of dollars in derivatives claims that have been filed against Lehman and its affiliates.

Of the $45bn in derivatives claims filed against Lehman and its affiliates, Lehman's administrators have settled just $5bn, according a report filed earlier this year on the status of Lehman's bankruptcy-exit plan. Big-bank claims represent about half of the remaining $40bn in derivatives claims.

Daniel Ehrmann, managing director at Alvarez & Marsal, the firm that is unwinding Lehman under Chapter 11, and the investment bank's head of international operations and co-head of derivatives, said: "We are hopeful that counterparties who have provided input to the framework will settle and look forward to announcing such progress soon."

For the settlement to work, Lehman says at least 10 of the big-bank counterparties must agree to the deal by June 30. Absent that approval, Lehman said it will "vigorously" contest the derivative claims and "seek to reduce such claims to amounts lower than the derivatives framework."

Among the big banks Lehman has sparred with over derivatives are Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse Group and JP Morgan Chase.

Representatives of Citi, Credit Suisse and BNY Mellon declined to comment on the proposal. BofA, Deutsche Bank and JP Morgan representatives couldn't immediately comment.

In effect, Lehman is offering to settle the claims using a common valuation method, in exchange for not seeking to reduce those claims in what would likely be lengthy and costly litigation.

According to Lehman's most recent Chapter 11 plan, about 30 financial institutions filed $22bn in derivatives claims against Lehman and its derivatives subsidiary. Lehman representatives have argued that figure is inflated. If the derivatives claims are calculated according to the new framework, Lehman estimates they would total about $10bn.

Derivatives represent a major source of cash for Lehman creditors waiting to get paid more than 2 1/2 years after the investment bank filed for bankruptcy protection on September 15, 2008.

Two other groups of creditors have floated their own Chapter 11 plans. One group, led by Paulson & Co, has put forth a plan that provides greater recovery for holders of Lehman's parent-company debt. A second group, whose members include Goldman Sachs Group and Morgan Stanley, has put forth a plan that benefits holders of Lehman subsidiary debt.

Judge James Peck of the US Bankruptcy Court is set to consider all three plans at a preliminary hearing in June.

http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2011-06-01/...esses-big-bank-deal  

bis dahin mal anderswo austoben, vllt nortel...

Grüße  

http://www.ariva.de/chart/images/chart.m?z=a5792~b1~K2468~Uall~W1  

@weltenbummler
gut, für dich besteht hier mehr risiko. allein die tatsache, dass teras, ich und co. hier investiert sind, gibt es auch leute, die hier scheinbar nicht mehr risiko sehen als bei wamuq. also, risiko ist wohl subjektiv in diesem fall.

zur gewinnchance: ich sehe DERZEIT wesentlich eine höhere gewinnchance bei lehmq als bei wamuq, da der kurs bei wamuq eben schon stark abging (siehe marcetcap-vergleich-verhältnis 1:9!!!). allein das verhältnis von A:L zum börsenwert bei lehmq indiziert eine wesentlich höhere gewinnchance.

zum risiko: es geht um den kampf gegen jpm und gs. wird der kampf gewonnen, gewinnt wamuq und lehmq. also gleiches risiko. verlieren wir, ist auch bei wamuq der ofen aus. letzteres glaube ich allerdings nicht. derzeit glaubens traurigerweise wenige nur weil wamuq stark gestiegen ist.

wichtig: bitte nicht von aktuellen kursen zu einer these hinreissen lassen. kurse sind nur MOMENTAUFNAHMEN  

Na, heute nix neues und keiner da?

Sind schon wieder alle am anderen Ufer bei Wamu?

Dann mach ich das was ich am besten kann: WARTEN !!!

Und nicht die Geduld verlieren.

 

http://de.advfn.com/...rt&s=NO%5Elehmq&p=0&t=39&vol=1  

was war denn das? ein schluckauf?

sieht doch gut aus
http://www.ariva.de/chart/images/chart.m?z=a2468~b83~Uquarter~W1  

was passiert denn hier gerade?

Der Chart hat Schluckauf ;-) Sehr passend beschrieben!

 

http://www.world-of-stocks.com/individual_values/lehmq  

...genau wie teras gesagt hat!  

lehman gewinnt gegen barclays!

"
Lehman entitled to disputed collateral, judge says

NEW YORK (Reuters) - Lehman Brothers Holdings (Other OTC:LEHMQ.PK - News) is entitled to $4 billion of disputed margin collateral assets in its legal fight with Barclays Plc (LSE:BARC.L - News), a bankruptcy judge ruled on Monday.

U.S. Judge James Peck issued the ruling from the bench at a court hearing in Lehman's long-running dispute with Barclays, which bought much of Lehman's U.S. operations at the height of the financial crisis in September 2008.

In February, the judge ruled that Lehman's hurried sale to Barclays was fair, but he also said that Barclays was not entitled to roughly $4 billion in margin collateral that Lehman had posted to cover outstanding derivatives trades.

A Barclays spokesman, Michael O'Looney, said after Monday's court hearing that the bank plans to appeal the judge's February ruling.

(Reporting by Jeff Roberts; Writing by Martha Graybow; Editing by Steve Orlofsky)  

geht nicht um diese 4 mrd, es geht um den skandal. ich wiederhole: jpm strich lehman die kreditlinien.  

Sieht nett aus der Chart...leck :)  

Danke!

Was bedeutet das jetzt für Lehman?  

 

TERAS
TERAS
TERAS

DER ABSOLUTE SPITZENTYP ;-)