Ambac Rocky Balboa oder chapter 11

http://www.benzinga.com/options/11/01/798380/...financial-group-abkfq

 

 

Ambac Klage oder Antrag gegen IRS um 700 milionen NOLs.

am 9.11.2011 Haupt Klage punkte;

AMBACs ANTRAG;

WHEREFORE AFG demands judgment as follows:
(1) On the First Claim for relief, a declaration, pursuant to Bankruptcy
Code section 505, that AFG and the members of the consolidated
group have no tax liability for tax years 2003 through 2008 and they
are entitled to retain the full amount of the Tax Refunds;

(2) On the Second Claim for relief, a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code sections 105(a)
and 362(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 7065, ordering the IRS to provide
five business days’ prior written notice (filed with the Court and
served contemporaneously by electronic mail on Debtor’s counsel)
before taking any Enforcement Action contrary to the State Court
Injunction, whether or not such injunction remains in effect; and

(3) Such other relief for the Debtor’s estate as is just.

http://www.kccllc.net/Docket/SearchResults.asp?T=2613

posting; 11/9/2010  0001

--------------------------------------------------

 

IRSs Gegenantwort

IRS anwälte hat am 14.01.2011 den ambacs Antrag  beantwortet

1- http://www.kccllc.net/documents/1015973/1015973110119000000000015.pdf

oder unteren Link

http://www.kccllc.net/Docket/SearchResults.asp?T=2613 ;posting 1/14/2011  0019

FIRST DEFENSE
The complaint should be dismissed to the extent the Court lacks jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint.

 

SECOND DEFENSE
Any judgment or injunction against the IRS is barred by sovereign immunity generally
and also by 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).

THIRD DEFENSE
The complaint should be dismissed to the extent it fails to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.
WHEREFORE the United States prays that this Court enter judgment in favor of
defendant, and against plaintiff, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint and granting such other and
further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

 

- noch weiter

2- http://www.kccllc.net/documents/1015973/1015973110119000000000016.pdf

oder den link http://www.kccllc.net/Docket/SearchResults.asp?T=2613; posting 1/14/2011  0020

At the heart of Ambac’s case is its contention that its method of accounting for credit default swaps (“CDSs”) – which was the basis for its recovery of tax refunds of over $700 million – was proper. As described in the Government’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw the Reference (“Withdrawal Motion”), resolution of this issue would require the court adjudicating this issue to wrestle with difficult and novel questions of tax law.

In addition, resolution of the injunction claim sought in the adversary proceeding, and likewise the PI Motion, would require a court to determine whether the injunction requested is barred by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

The relief sought by Ambac in the PI Motion is unprecedented and would violate the IRS’s sovereign rights under the IRC.

 

IRS sieht mit dem Ambacs Antrag ihre  Macht zu begrenzt zu fühlen. Ihre Anwälte haben so ähnliche Argumente wie bei dem Reh. Prozesse.Bei dem Reh. Prozess wurde IRSs Argumente von dem District court abgeleht. Ich hoffe, bei dem CH11 prozess wird es ähliches pasieren!

 

 

 

 

 

 

Vor ab, der Bericht ist zwar schon etwas älter aber nach wie vor noch sehr interessant !

Before You Get Excited About Bank Of America's Big Putback Settlement...


http://www.businessinsider.com/...as-way-more-putback-exposure-2011-1  

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/51166284/...Company-Profile---Jan-13-2011  

Ambac wird die Anwort von IRS am 1.2.2011 beantworten.

AFG’s time to submit a reply in further support of its PI Motion shall be extended
through and including February 1, 2011.

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/1015973/1015973110119000000000007.pdf

oder http://www.kccllc.net/Docket/SearchResults.asp?T=2613; posting 1/3/2011  0011.

16.2.2011 ambac hat der letzte offizielle Termin mit dem CH11 Richterin Chapman

Ich glaube, spätestens Ende Februar wird NOL problem geklärt.

Geduldig Abwarten und für die Gerechtigkeit und das Rechte von Shareholders zu beten.

 

Ist ja alles ganz nett und schön wie da um die NOL gekämpft wird, vor allem da es ja um die NOL geht die auf die Aktien gebunden sind.
Lasst euch aber von der Tatsache nicht ablenken, dass mit einer Auflösung der Firma den Aktionären am meisten geholfen sei. Es ist eigentlich an der Zeit die Türen zu schließen und Kasse zu machen, dass Munibook zu verkaufen, die Schulden zu bezahlen und die Reserven mit anderen Erlösen an die Aktionäre aus zu schütten. In diesem Sinne hätten die Angestellten noch ihre Pensionskasse.  

 

Ambac shareholders to be 'in the money' by $5B or more, investor claims

http://www.morrisanderson.com/resource-center/...re-investor-claims2/

 

 

 

As described in the Government’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw the Reference (“Withdrawal Motion”), resolution of this issue would require the court adjudicating this issue to wrestle with difficult and novel questions of tax law

 

-wie die Beschreibung des regierungs Memorandums durch die Unterstützung Abhebungs Antrag(“Withdrawal Motion), um diese Problem zu lösen, benötigt es ein Gerichtliche Urteil, es ist wiederum mit dem schweren und neuen Steuergesetzt herumringt oder umfasst.

 

wichtige Punkte von IRS Ausserungen;

1-IRS lehnt erstmal nicht ab,  Ambac Anspruch auf den 700 milionen NOLs.

2-Ihre ständige Argumente ist durch solche Anträge( z.B Ambacs PI motion)  ihren Sovereign Immunität blockiert.

wir werden sehen , wie es weiter geht.

Bis zum 31.1 hat BAC Zeit, mit den RMBS investoren sich zu einigen. Sonst kommt heftige Klage Welle gegen BAC

Ausserdem ab nächsten Monat wird WikiLeaks ihre Daten wahrscheinlich veröffentlichen.

im Februar und März  werden wir bei dem put buy back Problem vieles erleben.

 

 

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/1015973/1015973101215000000000002.pdf  

http://www.cnbc.com/id/41228798

The U.S. Treasury's toxic asset funds have gained 27 percent since they  were created to help revive the mortgage-backed securities market,  according to data expected to be released later on Monday.

As part of the government's deeply unpopular  $700 billion bailout program, the funds were set up to remove illiquid  securities from banks by matching private capital with taxpayer money  and Treasury loans via funds run by private investment managers.

Although  furor over the bailout helped Republicans win control of the House of  Representatives in the recent election, the government has been  recouping taxpayers' money.

 

The eight toxic asset funds, run by asset managers such as BlackRock [BLK  193.46        0.39  (+0.2%)   ], Invesco and Marathon Asset Management, are all profitable.

Since  the funds were established in 2009, they have used about $5.2 billion  of Treasury's equity investment to buy toxic assets. As of the end of  2010, the funds have gained $1.1 billion to about $6.3 billion,  according to the data.

Including  some $300 million in equity distributions, the Treasury's investment  increased by 27 percent or $1.4 billion, according to the data.

The  Treasury Department had initially proposed buying up to $1 trillion in  illiquid mortgage-related securities to help clean up banks' balance  sheets.

But the program was scaled down considerably as  banks proved they could attract private capital in both the equity and  debt markets without first selling off illiquid securities.

As  of Dec. 31, the funds had about $29.4 billion of purchasing power and  had drawn down about 70 percent of the total amount, according to the  data.

The  Congressional Budget Office has estimated the ultimate cost of the bank  bailout, or the Troubled Asset Relief Program, will be as low as $25  billion.

 

Mortgage Document Destruction Cases to Get Hearings
http://www.cnbc.com/id/41230512

Mortgage Giants Leave Legal Bills to the Taxpayers
http://www.cnbc.com/id/41232921  

http://ih.advfn.com/...rt&s=NO%5EabkfQ&p=0&t=16&vol=1  

Ambac Says JPMorgan Refused Mortgage Repurchases It Also Sought

Jan. 25 (Bloomberg) -- JPMorgan Chase & Co. demanded that a lender repurchase bad mortgages even as it resisted calls to buy back the loans from bonds created by Bear Stearns Cos., an insurer said in court papers.

“That would be pretty bad” if true, said Joshua Rosner, an analyst at New York-based research firm Graham Fisher & Co. He said such allegations show why “investors and consumers have a right to be distrustful of the banks’ statements.”

Ambac Assurance Corp., the debt guarantor partly seized last year by Wisconsin’s insurance commissioner, made the claim in a proposed amended complaint in its lawsuit against Bear Stearns’s EMC Mortgage unit, now owned by JPMorgan. Ambac, seeking to add a fraud claim to the case, referenced depositions, e-mail and letters in the filing, which was unsealed Jan. 14 in Manhattan federal court.

Mortgage-bond investors and other insurers, including Allstate Corp., Pacific Investment Management Co. and MBIA Inc., have accused loan sellers or bond underwriters of sometimes misrepresenting the quality of the underlying debt enough to trigger contractual or legal provisions requiring repurchases. So-called mortgage putbacks may cost banks and lenders as much as $90 billion, JPMorgan bond analysts said in an October report.

Jennifer Zuccarelli, a spokeswoman for New York-based JPMorgan, declined to comment on the filing, which the company had fought to keep secret. A federal judge must still rule on whether to allow the amended complaint to go forward.

Insured Bonds

Bear Stearns sought on March 11, 2008 -- just weeks before the collapsing company agreed to be bought by JPMorgan -- to have a lender buy back mortgages in bonds insured by Syncora Guarantee Inc., according to the filing. Bear Stearns said the mortgages failed to meet promised standards of quality.

At the same time, Bear Stearns was denying demands from Syncora that it repurchase the loans, even though the insurer cited the same flaws, according to the filing. Bear Stearns had bought the loans and packaged them into bonds to sell to investors.

JPMorgan later maintained “that it is EMC’s position that these breaches materially and adversely affect the value” of the loans, according to the complaint, which cited a June 26, 2008, letter from Alison Malkin, an executive director in JPMorgan’s securities unit, to the lender, a now-closed unit of Capital One Financial Corp.

‘Diametrically Opposing’

“Remarkably, Malkin took diametrically opposing positions in repeatedly refusing to comply with all but 4 percent of Syncora’s repurchase demands,” Ambac said in the proposed amended complaint.

The lawsuit was filed in November 2008. New York-based Ambac Financial Group Inc., Ambac Assurance’s parent, filed for bankruptcy protection last year. Syncora, which was ordered to stop paying claims by New York regulators in 2008, is also suing EMC Mortgage.

On Dec. 16, U.S. Magistrate Judge Theodore Katz issued a report and recommendations to U.S. District Court Judge Richard Berman in New York, who is presiding over the Ambac case. Katz, who is handling pretrial matters, recommended that Ambac be allowed to add a fraudulent-inducement claim against EMC.

EMC’s lawyers on Jan. 14 argued against letting Ambac file the proposed amended complaint. EMC has also asked Katz to reconsider his ruling.

JPMorgan last quarter set aside $1.5 billion in litigation reserves to cover costs related to buying back faulty mortgages. Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon said it will take years to resolve the disputes and to determine the ultimate cost to his bank.

‘Ugly Mess’

“It’s going to be a long ugly mess, but it won’t be life- threatening to JPMorgan,” he told analysts on a Jan. 14 conference call.

The bank also ignored the findings of mortgage-review firm Clayton Holdings LLC in abandoning mortgage repurchases that Bear Stearns had been considering in early 2008 stemming from a pool of 596 of loans in bonds guaranteed by Ambac, according to the insurer’s amended complaint.

Clayton found that 56 percent of the loans involved “material” breaches of Bear Stearns’s contractual promises, according to the filing, which cited a copy of a November 2007 document from the review firm to the company.

As Malkin overruled Bear Stearns decisions on which mortgages to repurchase to limit JPMorgan reserve expenses, the portion of those loans that were approved for repurchase fell to 2.2 percent by September 2008, according to the complaint.

Proof that the bank ignored a third-party review is “major, that’s hugely newsworthy,” said Isaac Gradman, a San Francisco-based consultant and formerly a lawyer at Howard Rice Nemerovski Canady Falk & Rabkin.

Both Sides

With the Syncora loans, “if they’re making an argument out of one side of their mouth and a different argument out of the other, that is arguably a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and would be very strong evidence to prove repurchase demands,” he said in a telephone interview. Gradman represented mortgage insurer PMI Group Inc. in a now-settled lawsuit over similar issues against General Electric Co. and its defunct mortgage unit

Ambac also alleges in its proposed complaint that, as early as 2005, Bear Stearns was making a strategy out of earning “double” money on shoddy mortgages. First Bear Stearns sold securities backed by the debt, then forced the mortgage lender that sold it the loans to pay up when they turned delinquent in the first few months or were otherwise proved to have breached originators’ representations, Ambac said.

Bear Stearns generally wouldn’t refund investors with that second pool of money, Ambac said in the filing.

Early Payment

While such so-called early payment defaults may not require repurchases of mortgages out of securities by the issuers of the bonds, because of differences between securitization contracts and those entered into by lenders, Bear Stearns’s policy raised questions at the time, according to the complaint.

External auditor PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP advised Bear Stearns in August 2006 that it needed to review loans that were defaulting or defective to see if their quality breached its obligations and begin the “immediate processing of the buy-out if there is a clear breach in order to match common industry practices, the expectation of investors and to comply” with its mortgage bonds’ contracts, according to the amended complaint.

Its own lawyers by early 2007 were making similar suggestions, according to the complaint.

Securitized Loans

By the end of 2005, Bear Stearns had moved to making sure to securitize home loans before their early payment default periods ended, without informing investors and insurers of the switch, according to the complaint.

Then, if the loans went delinquent or were otherwise found defective, the company would seek settlements from lenders, rather than repurchases, which would have required the cash paid by originators to flow through to the securitization trusts so the debt could be passed back, according to the complaint.

“That is how we pay for the lights,” one employee told another in an Aug. 11, 2005, e-mail cited in Ambac’s filing.

In 2007 and the first quarter of 2008, Bear Stearns resolved repurchase claims to lenders on more than $1.3 billion of mortgages through settlements or for other consideration, according to the complaint, which cited the deposition of an employee. The securities firm received more than $367 million of “economic value,” according to the complaint.

Wells Fargo Suit

Also this month, EMC Mortgage was sued by Wells Fargo & Co., which is acting as the trustee for another set of mortgage bonds, for refusing to turn over documents detailing the quality of loans packaged into those securities.

An investor believes the files show some of the loans should be repurchased, according to the complaint filed Jan. 18 in Delaware Chancery Court in Wilmington. Wells Fargo “has repeatedly requested that EMC provide access to the subject documents,” the San Francisco-based bank said in the complaint.

“EMC has played proverbial ‘rope a dope’ and otherwise continued to drag its feet, and has produced nothing,” according to the complaint.

Washington Mutual Inc., the Seattle-based bank whose assets were mostly acquired by JPMorgan after it failed in 2008, has been another source of litigation. Last September, Deutsche Bank AG, acting as a trustee for bondholders, refiled a lawsuit over allegedly misrepresented loans in $34 billion of WaMu mortgage securities, with $165 billion in original balances.

The suit, filed in federal court in the District of Columbia, included JPMorgan as a defendant after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. said that JPMorgan was wrongly claiming its insurance fund had agreed to cover the liabilities, according to the amended complaint.

JPMorgan is balking at turning over loan files to the trustee, according to Deutsche Bank. Either JPMorgan or the FDIC owes investors $6 billion to $10 billion, according to the complaint.

The case is Ambac v. EMC Mortgage, 08-cv-9464, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-01-25/...es-it-also-sought.html

 

was für folgen hat dieser Artikel für AMBAC?

Ich verstehe diesen Artikel auf Grund meiner geringen Englischkenntnisse nicht.

Ich wäre für eine Kurze Erklärung sehr dankbar.

mfg  

Stell dir eine Kette mit 3 Akteuren vor.
1. Legt faulen Pfanbrief auf - mit Garantie über die Angaben
2. JPM kauft diesen und andere Pfandbriefe und versichert sie bei AMBAC - mit Garantie über die Angaben
3. AMBAC

Nun sollen die Garantien eingelöst werden, dabei dreht sich die Kette:
3. AMBAC will von JPM die Garantie eingelöst haben.
2.1. JPM lehnt die Garantieansprüche ab, versucht aber im Geheimen von 1. seine Garanie - dies ist genau die gleiche die sie an AMBAC weitergegeben hatten - einzulösen.
1.  Legte faulen Pfanbrief auf.

Wie will jetzt JPM AMBAC die gleiche Garantie verweigern, die JPM bei 1 einösen will, mit der gleichen Begründung wie AMBAC gegen JPM hat????????????

Begriffen? Lawinengefahr!  

auf 7075 würde ich achten, also Blick auch auf unteres BB  

Former Bear Stearns mortgage executives who now run mortgage  divisions of Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, and Ally Financial have  been accused of cheating and defrauding investors through the mortgage  securities they created and sold while at Bear. According to e-mails and  internal audits, JPMorgan had known about this fraud since the spring  of 2008, but hid it from the public eye through legal maneuvering. Last  week a lawsuit filed in 2008 by mortgage insurer Ambac Assurance Corp  against Bear Stearns and JPMorgan was unsealed. The lawsuit’s supporting  e-mails, going back as far as 2005, highlight Bear traders telling  their superiors they were selling investors like Ambac a “sack of shit.”  . . .

In 2007, when Ambac started to realize something was very wrong with  its high-rated bonds, it demanded Bear provide loan-level detail and  reviewed 695 non-performing loans in its portfolio. Ambac’s audit  concluded that 80 percent of the loans showed an early payment default. This meant they should have never have been packed in the bonds Bear  sold and were required to be repurchased. Bear refused, and of course  had already been pocketing buyback money for itself from the  originators. Bear also never told investors that its auditor Price  Waterhouse and Coopers submitted an internal review in August 2006 that  this repurchase process was not in-line with its due diligence standards  and not typical for the industry. By January 2007, a Bear internal  audit also reported the firm had collected $1.7 billion in repurchase  claims — a 227% increase over the previous year. Yet Marano’s group of  traders continued their double-dip payment scheme and kept selling the  toxic loans with full awareness of the poor quality of the due  diligence.”

 

 

http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2011/01/...Picture+%28The+Big+Picture%29

 

mann kann mittlerweile alles versichern.

The lawsuit’s supporting  e-mails, going back as far as 2005, highlight Bear traders telling  their superiors they were selling investors like Ambac a “sack of shit.”  . . .

Marlboromann,
was meinst Du mit 7075 ?  

Thread gedacht gewesen und ist ausversehen hier gelandet.  

Order by U.S. Court of Appeals für Reh.Prozesse;

Viele haben in dieser Woche ein Urteil bei dem Reh. Plan erwartet.

Leider heiterenhimmel kommt ein neuen Brief von US seventh circuit Chicago!

 

US court wird bis zum 2.2.2011 ein Memorandum zum Wisconsin state court einreichen. Es geht um den OCIs Antrags für remand.

anscheind US (IRS) will Zeit gewinnen.

http://ambacpolicyholders.com/court-filings/

Jan. 20, 2011: Order by U.S. Court of Appeals

--------------------------------------------------

http://ambacpolicyholders.com/court-filings/

OCI Letter to Court of Appeals Regarding Effect of Removal

Die Antwort von OCI über die neu Entwicklung

--------------------------------------------------

Bankrupty Prozess:

Ambac wird bis zum 1.2.2011 die Antwort  von IRS benatworten.

Beide Fälle gehen um die IRS Steueranforderung von AAC assets. IRS will erst die Antwort vom ambac bekommen.und Danach will es sowohl beim reh. Prozess als auch bei bankrupty prozesse für ihren eigenen Gunsten eine neue strategie

 

www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/01/...ut-of-billions/70128/According to the lawsuit, the Bear traders would sell toxic mortgage securities to investors and then sell back the bad loans with early payment defaults to the banks that originated them at a discount. The traders would pocket the refund, and would not pass it on to the mortgage trust, which was where it should have gone to be distributed to the investors who owned the bonds. The Marano-led traders also cut the time allowed for early payment defaults, without telling the bond investors. That way, Bear could quickly securitize defective loans, without leaving enough time for investors to do their own due diligence after the bonds were sold and put-back any bad loans to Bear.
 

The traders were essentially double-dipping -- getting paid twice on the deal.

The traders were essentially double-dipping -- getting paid twice on the deal. How was this possible? Once the security was sold, they didn't have a legal claim to get cash back from the bad loans -- that claim belonged to bond investors -- but they did so anyway and kept the money. Thus, Bear was cheating the investors they promised to have sold a safe product out of their cash. According to former Bear Stearns and EMC traders and analysts who spoke with The Atlantic, Nierenberg and Verschleiser were the decision-makers for the double dipping scheme, and thus, are named as individual defendants in the suit.

Bear deal manager Nicolas Smith wrote an e-mail on August 11th, 2006 to Keith Lind, a Managing Director on the trading desk, referring to a particular bond, SACO 2006-8, as "SACK OF SHIT [2006-]8" and said, "I hope your [sic] making a lot of money off this trade."

It's this blatant internal awareness inside the Bear mortgage trading division that the Ambac suits says led Bear to implement an across-the-board strategy to disregard its contractual promises and conceal the defective loans. By JPMorgan taking over Bear, it became the successor of interest in Bear Stearns. As the lawsuit lays out, JPMorgan is responsible for the flagrant accounting fraud started by Bear designed to avoid, and has continued to avoid, recognition of vast off-balance sheet exposure relating to its contractual repurchase agreements. This allowed executives to reap tens of millions of dollars in compensation from a bank that wouldn't have been able to buy Bear without tax payer assistance.

80% of Loans Went Bad Almost Immediately

In 2007, when Ambac started to realize something was very wrong with its high-rated bonds, it demanded Bear provide loan-level detail and reviewed 695 non-performing loans in its portfolio. Ambac's audit concluded that 80 percent of the loans showed an early payment default. This meant they should have never have been packed in the bonds Bear sold and were required to be repurchased. Bear refused, and of course had already been pocketing buyback money for itself from the originators. Bear also never told investors that its auditor Price Waterhouse and Coopers submitted an internal review in August 2006 that this repurchase process was not in-line with its due diligence standards and not typical for the industry. By January 2007, a Bear internal audit also reported the firm had collected $1.7 billion in repurchase claims -- a 227% increase over the previous year. Yet Marano's group of traders continued their double-dip payment scheme and kept selling the toxic loans with full awareness of the poor quality of the due diligence.

Jeffrey Verschleiser even said in an e-mail that he knew this was an issue. He wrote to his peer Mike Nierenberg in March 2006, "[we] are wasting way too much money on Bad Due Diligence." Yet a year later nothing had changed. In March 2007, Verschleiser wrote to Nierenberg again about the same due diligence firm, "[w]e are just burning money hiring them."

Then in November 2007, Verschleiser wrote to his risk committee that he knew insurers for mortgage securities were going to have big financial problems. He suggested they multiply by ten times the short bet he'd just made against stocks like Ambac. These e-mails show Verschleiser's trading desk bragging to firm leadership that he made $55 million off shorting insurers' stock in just three weeks.

Eventually, as Ambac kept demanding a repurchase of the bad loans, Bear acknowledged in late 2007 it would have to buy some back. The lawsuit lists over $600 million in claims with $1.2 billion in damages from the soured mortgage securities it invested in and insured against. But according to the lawsuit, in the spring of 2008, JPMorgan dismissed an outside audit review of the loans' need to be repurchased and once again refused to pay Ambac. The suit asserts JPMorgan knew a repurchase would result in a huge accounting liability that would put their balance sheet in serious trouble at that time.
 

The [put-back] issue is "not that material" for JPMorgan. -CEO Jamie Dimon

Last week, JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon said it will take years to get through mortgage litigation risk the bank inherited and had set aside around $9 billion for litigation-related risk. Yet in the bank's January earnings call, Dimon suggested that the bank may not have to buy back any soured mortgages from private investors and said that the issue is "not that material" for JPMorgan. Still, Ambac recently won a court order in December to add accounting fraud against JPMorgan to its suit, which can double or triple lawsuit awards. So it's hard to tell whether America's largest bank is prepared to pay for the sins of Bear. JPMorgan did fight tooth and nail for the Ambac suit not to be made public, however, because the firm argued it could damage the reputations of senior bank executives currently working in the industry. Individuals named as defendants included: Jimmy Cayne, Alan "ACE" Greenberg, Warren Spector, Alan Schwartz, Thomas Marano, Jeffrey Mayer, Mary Haggerty, Baron Silverstein, Jeffrey Verschleiser, and Michael Nierenberg.

Ambac's lawsuit is led by Eric Haas of Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP. Depositions show internal Bear executives saying Nierenberg and Verschleiser were responsible for deciding how much risk to take when acquiring loans and for aspects of the securitization process. They reported up to Marano. Testimony shows Marano would have known about the decisions his head traders were making. When asked about these accusations, Nierenberg's, Marano's, and Verschleiser's current employers had no comment. The defendants' lawyers at Greenberg Traurig LLP failed to respond to calls for comment.

A public hearing is currently scheduled to be held by the New York State assembly regarding whether legal action should be brought against banks for misleading insurers about mortgage related securities. If approved, the New York Attorney General will likely be asked to bring criminal fraud charges against these banks. Now we must wait and see if JPMorgan will settle or go to trial -- or if the bank tries to claw back tens of millions of dollars in pay from the former Bear executives.

 

Ganzer Aritkel unter

 

jetzt wird aufgebaut,mal schaun was kommen wird.auf jedenfall wird es erstmal steigen,denn viele haben verluste erlitten und jetzt könnten sie es wieder zurückerobern.

faktisch stand abk noch gut da,nur ob es auch so gehandhabt wird werden wir sehen.

hab auf jedenfall aufgestockt...........

ohne risiko ,kein großer gewinn möglich !!!

NATÜRLICH NUR MEINE MEINUNG  

noch nachgelegt habe sonst hätte ich mich jetzt geärgert