Ambac Rocky Balboa oder chapter 11
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Nach dem Breif von Dilweg ist die Frage über 700 Millionen Taxrefunds noch offen. Es ist nicht klar! sowohl AFG als auch AAC hat den Anspruch dafür.
United States Department of the Treasury in regard to certain tax refunds claimed by
AFGI. Such liability could be in excess of $700 million, and in theory, could attach as a
lien on the assets of AFGI or any of its subsidiaries, including AAC
seite 43;http://www.ambac.com/pdfs/First_Day_Affidavit.pdf
bis 31.12.2010 beide Parteien machen keine Aktion. Ab nächstes Jahr beginnt die Auftelung und Diskussion über den 700 milionen NOLs
und noch seite 44
http://www.ambac.com/pdfs/First_Day_Affidavit.pdf
Nach der Vereinbarung im 8.november ist von OCI bestatigt worden, dass AAC Eigentum zum Ambac gehört.
"AFG retains ownership of AAC."
dies hier von Seite 45 :
This term sheet has been prepared for discussion and settlement purposes only and is nonbinding, but shall serve as the basis for further negotiations. The terms and conditions set forth herein are subject to negotiation and execution and, where applicable, delivery of definitive documents satisfactory in form and substance to all parties.
Das ist also nur ein Vorschlag vom management,jedoch noch keinesfalls entschieden
Ambac Assurance Corp. policyholders wissen sie auch,dass ein Teil von NOLs nach der Vereinbarung am 8.oktober zu AFG eingezahlt wird. Natürlich AAC Gläubiger ist gegen dieser Aktion
aber Andereseite AFG hat auch ihre eigene Gläubiger.
Sie haben auch den Anspruch auf den NOL´s.
und jetz kommt wichtige Frage, Welche Policholders haben Priorität?
Ich glaube beide!
ich vermute, dass NOL´s für AAC und AFG aufteilen wird
Das ist also nur ein Vorschlag vom management,jedoch noch keinesfalls entschieden
aber auch auf dieser Basis wird es weiter verhandeln;
wieder geupdatet: http://www.world-of-stocks.com/rt_data/abk
Nov 12 (Reuters Legal) - Bankrupt bond insurer Ambac Financial Group awarded its top lawyer a $100,000 cash bonus for his efforts to preserve the company's cash, it said in a regulatory filing on Friday.
Ambac's board awarded the bonus to general counsel Kevin Doyle on November 5, the company said in the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filing.
It cited "his efforts to maximize the Company's cash position, thereby assisting the Company in its efforts to emerge successfully from Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings."
Ambac, which had been the second-largest U.S. bond insurer before being crushed by losses on risky mortgages, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on November 8.
An Ambac spokesman was not immediately available to comment on the decision.
The bankruptcy filing is In re Ambac Financial Group Inc, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York, No. 10-15973. Dewey LeBoeuf of New York is representing Ambac in the bankruptcy proceedings.
http://www.businessinsider.com/...stions-on-foreclosure-fraud-2010-11
http://www.streetinsider.com/Special+Reports/...me+Highs/6102515.html
Form 8-K for AMBAC FINANCIAL GROUP INC
Change in Directors or Principal Officers
Item 5.02 Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors;
Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers
(e) Special Bonus awarded to Kevin Doyle,
Senior Vice President and General Counsel
On November 5, 2010, the Compensation Committee of Ambac Financial Group, Inc. (the "Company") awarded Kevin Doyle, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, a special bonus of $100,000 in recognition of his efforts to maximize the Company's cash position, thereby assisting the Company in its efforts to emerge successfully from Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.
Wall Street Collects $4 Billion From Taxpayers as Swaps Backfire
By Michael McDonald – Nov 9, 2010 10:01 PM MT
The subprime mortgage crisis isn’t the only calamity Wall Street created that’s upending the finances of U.S. states and cities.
For more than a decade, banks and insurance companies convinced governments and nonprofits that financial engineering would lower interest rates on bonds sold for public projects such as roads, bridges and schools. That failed promise has cost more than $4 billion, according to data compiled by Bloomberg, as hundreds of borrowers from the Bay Area Toll Authority in Oakland, California, to Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, quietly paid Wall Street to end agreements since 2008.
California’s water resources department this year spent $305 million unwinding interest-rate bets that backfired, handing over the money to banks led by New York-based Morgan Stanley. North Carolina paid $59.8 million in August, enough to cover the annual salaries of about 1,400 full-time state employees. Reading, Pennsylvania, which sought protection in the state’s fiscally distressed communities program, got caught on the wrong end of the deals, costing it $21 million, equal to more than a year’s worth of real-estate taxes.
“It was brilliant, and it all blew up on me,” said Brian Mayhew, chief financial officer of the Bay Area Toll Authority, the state agency that gave Ambac Financial Group Inc., the New York-based bond insurer that filed for bankruptcy this week, $105 million to end $1.1 billion of interest-rate agreements. The payments equal more than two months of revenue on seven bridges the authority oversees around San Francisco.
Budget Deficits
The termination payments to Wall Street firms come at the worst possible time. The longest recession since the Great Depression left states facing budget gaps of $72 billion next fiscal year, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures. U.S. cities saw their general fund revenue fall the most since at least 1986 in the budget year that ended June 30, according to the National League of Cities.
http://www.themarketfinancial.com/in-the-news-today-11/102706
But never has this been clearer than in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Small banks that took no part in reckless lending are saddled with higher costs because of the bailout used to rescue big banks that messed up; individuals who scrimped and saved during the boom are being hurt by interest rates kept artificially low to rescue the economy.
Yet another situation involving haves and have-nots is evident in the workout plan covering policyholders of the Ambac Assurance Corporation, the Ambac Financial Group subsidiary that insured municipal and structured finance obligations.
Ambac Financial, which has been struggling since the crisis began, filed for bankruptcy protection last Monday after skipping an interest payment on a debt issue. Financial filings from Sept. 30 showed that Ambac had about $912 million in capital and about $7.9 billion in resources to pay claims.
Ambac’s insurance subsidiary is domiciled in Wisconsin, and Sean Dilweg, the state’s insurance commissioner, is overseeing the rehabilitation. He has submitted a plan for the company, which the Dane County Circuit Court must approve. A week of hearings on its pros and cons is scheduled to begin there on Monday.
Any plan to rehabilitate Ambac is bound to be complex, given the array of deals the company did in its high-cotton days. The company not only insured municipal debt and mortgage-backed securities, but it also wrote credit default swaps on collateralized debt obligations — the same financial nitroglycerine that toppled the American International Group.
Mr. Dilweg says his plan treats all 15,000 Ambac policyholders fairly. In an interview last Friday, he conceded that his proposal is unique, saying, “We have longstanding statutory tools that I am using to fully protect the policyholders.”
Ambac declined to comment.
THE commissioner’s plan would separate the insurer into two entities. One, known as the “segregated account,” contains $50 billion in policies written on mortgage securities and a small group of other unrelated issues, like debt raised to build a monorail in Las Vegas. There are roughly $30 billion of mortgage securities in this account. Anyone who holds policies on mortgage debt would receive 25 cents on the dollar in cash on the claims and a note for the rest — payable in 2020. The notes carry an interest rate of 5.1 percent.
The rest of the company, if the plan goes through, will contain all the other Ambac policies, predominantly those insuring municipal debt. Any parties that hold the $300 billion worth of policies in this segment will receive full value.
But a group of investors holding $23 billion of Ambac-insured mortgage securities are attacking the good-bank/bad-bank proposal in court. They argue that the plan is treating them unfairly by giving them just a fraction of the face value of their policies, even though the municipal debt policies would be paid in full.
This second-class treatment isn’t the only element of Mr. Dilweg’s plan that has upset the mortgage investors. They are also disturbed by the fact that in June the commissioner quietly allowed Ambac to unwind $13 billion in credit default swaps it had written for 14 financial institutions, most of them from overseas. Ambac paid $4.6 billion in cash and notes under this deal, depleting funds available to pay Ambac policyholders.
The money went out the door even though swaps aren’t typically given the same kind of seniority in a bankruptcy as traditional insurance. In a bankruptcy filing, the holders of such swaps are generally considered unsecured creditors and have to be paid after holders of old-fashioned insurance.
Finally, the mortgage investors are astounded that Mr. Dilweg’s plan keeps Ambac’s executives, some of the same managers who wrecked the company, in place. Moreover, the plan protects these managers from lawsuits except for intentional fraud and willful misconduct. Participation in the plan bars investors from suing Ambac management for gross negligence, for example.
“A fundamental precept of rehabilitation is to eliminate the management that caused it — that management must bear some responsibility for Ambac’s financial collapse,” lawyers for the investors said in a filing.
(Page 2 of 2)
The company doesn’t seem to agree. Late Friday, Ambac disclosed that it awarded its longtime general counsel a special bonus of $100,000 “in recognition of his efforts to maximize the company’s cash position.”
While all this might seem like just another food fight among financial titans, we beleaguered taxpayers have an interest in the outcome. That’s because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are among those objecting to the plan; the mortgage finance twins own $3.25 billion in Ambac-insured securities that Mr. Dilweg’s plan would disadvantage.
Mr. Dilweg, who was appointed by the court as the overseer of the Ambac case, said that segregating the loss-ridden mortgage securities from other healthier deals insured by Ambac is the best approach for all its policyholders and for the public.
As for keeping management in place, Mr. Dilweg said that four new independent directors would help provide oversight at the insurance company. “I recognize the conflict but we have a vendor relationship” with the company, Mr. Dilweg said. “If they are not performing I can sever the relationships with all 300 employees.”
He argued that the $4.6 billion deal with the foreign banks to unwind the credit default swaps benefited all of Ambac’s policyholders. He said he considered the holders of those swaps to be policyholders.
“This is very different from the accepted practice in a federal bankruptcy proceeding,” said David M. Greenwald, a lawyer at Jenner & Block, which represents a group of mortgage security policyholders. “There, the court must hold a fairness hearing in which each side has to explain why the proposed settlement is fair to other creditors, and does not reward junior creditors in an early settlement at the expense of senior creditors — in this case policyholders who by statute must be made whole first.”
In addition to the problematic swaps payout, other aspects of the proposal seem unfair to mortgage securities policyholders. While the plan is under consideration, Ambac has not been paying claims on mortgage securities that have experienced losses. But those investors continue to pay premiums into the general company account, which pays out 100 percent on municipal bond insurance claims — but not on their mortgage debt insurance.
Then there’s the fact that the general account — not the mortgage securities account — will receive any money Ambac recovers in its efforts to force mortgage originators to buy back improper loans insured by the company. It seems bizarre that those recoveries won’t be channeled to the mortgage securities policyholders.
PATRICK J. TROSTLE, a lawyer at Jenner & Block, maintains that Mr. Dilweg’s plan would trample on the contractual rights of many Ambac policyholders.
“Those policyholders would be required to wait years and years for payment of their claims with no certainty that full payment will ever come,” he said. “Meanwhile, the regulator is assisting the wrongful transfer of billions of dollars of assets to the parent shareholder and fighting to preserve a role for Ambac’s management, which brought Ambac to its present plight.”
Not that we needed another example, but you can add Ambac’s regulator-approved rehabilitation plan to the long list of cases where accountability for the financial mess is AWOL.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/business/...ewanted=2&src=busln
regarding the Form 3115 filed in 2008 and Ambac’s calculation of the Tax Refunds.
Additionally, the IRS questioned the loss-accounting methods underlying Ambac’s reported
consolidated NOLs of approximately $7.3 billion as of September 30, 2010.
Ambac hat am 28.10 die IDR(information document request) vom IRS empfangen.
unter IDR stand die Ambacs-Kalkulation von Tax Refunds und IRS frage über the Tax Refunds.
Seite 16.
http://www.ambac.com/pdfs/First_Day_Affidavit.pdf
In the days following receipt of the IDR, I and other members of the Debtor’s
management reviewed the potential ramifications of the IDR. Because (i) the Tax Refunds were
transferred to AFG by the IRS pursuant to a Form 1139 (see paragraph 13 hereof) and (ii) AFG
is in financial distress, the IRS could assess AFG for a deficiency, and immediately (a) obtain
liens and levy upon AFG’s cash assets, (b) obtain liens and levy upon AAC’s assets, and/or
(c) obtain liens and levy upon the assets of any other Ambac entity, all without notice to the
Debtor or an opportunity to pay or object to such assessed deficiency. We determined that, if the
IRS were to take such enforcement actions with respect to AAC, there is a real risk that OCI
would quickly thereafter commence a rehabilitation of the General Account, which would likely
17
NY3 3011714.18
cause collateral damage as previously described and would also seriously jeopardize or
completely destroy AFG’s reorganization prospects.
aber der wahre Hintergrund sieht es anders aus.
Ich vermute, AAC Policholders and Rehabilitationcouert haben IRS unter Druck gesetzt.(We determined that, if the
IRS were to take such enforcement actions with respect to AAC)
d.h. Sie haben verhindert, Tax refunds den Ambac auszahlen zu dürfen.
sonst Ambac hat genug cash die 2,8 millionen Zinsrate zuzahlen. Problem ist nicht die Zinszahlung.
Das Problem ist den Anspruch auf NOL und die Zahlung an die Anleihen August 2011
und jetzt nach der CH11 brachte ambac sich selbst auch unter dem US Gerichtschutz. Ausserdem Ambac und OCI wisconsin führten die Verhandlung seit den einigen Wochen über die Aufteilung NOLs und anderen Themen durch.
seit dem 25.März 10 AAC- rehabilitation ist unter dem Schutz rehabilitation court
Nach dem CH11 Mutterkonzern AFG ist auch unter dem Schutz CH11court.
und die Hintertüren verhandeln OCI und AFG weiter
in October 2010, OCI approved a $37 million dividend by Ambac
(Bermuda) Ltd. (“Ambac Bermuda”) to the Debtor. Following the dividend payment, the
Debtor’s projections indicated that available cash would remain above $50 million for the
14
NY3 3011714.18
remainder of 2010
seite 13. paragraf 27.
http://www.ambac.com/pdfs/First_Day_Affidavit.pdf
aktuelle Cash stand bei ambac ist im Oktober 2010 fast 50 millionen dollar.
Deswegen Hauptproblem ist nicht 2,8 millionen Zinssatz!
Hauptproblem sind den Anspruch auf ihren Assests und NOLs, nicht zu verlieren, sich behalten
damit ihre Anleihen 2011 august auszahlen und ihre Schulden reorganizieren können.
Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner Sean Dilweg will ask a state court judge to approve a plan to “rehabilitate” Ambac Assurance Corp.’s $50 billion portfolio of policies to insure residential mortgage-backed securities.
Wisconsin Circuit Court Judge William D. Johnston is slated to hear five days of testimony and evidence that began today before ruling on Dilweg’s plan to repay claimants 25 percent of their money now, and the balance in nine years at 5.1 percent interest. [..]
Glaub bei meinem Kaufkurs von 13,8ct kann ich nicht viel falsch machen.
Ambac Bankruptcy Foils Synthetic Securities
http://newyork.citybizlist.com/YourCityBizNews/detail.aspx?id=102853
Wisconsin Insurance Chief Seeks Ambac Plan Approval
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-15/wisconsin-insurance-chief-seeks-approval-for-ambac-plan-to-repay-claims.html
Laut der Information von Mr. Wallace hat Ende Oktober2010 ambac 50 millionen cash !
und liegt seit 9.11 unter dem schutz CH11.
Ihre Kasse wird auch von der CH11 kontrolliert.
jetzt kommt es eine wichtige Frage?
wie reagiert CH 11 court gegen die 2,8 millionen Zinszahlung von ambac?
Ambac hat genug cash, um ihr Zinsschulden zu zahlen
wenn CH11 court die Zinszahlung von ambac beglichen würde, wären fällige CDS nicht mehr aktiviert.
aber was passiert es denn die Anleihe August 2011?
Alle unter diesen Aspekten wird NOLs für Ambac noch wichtiger werden, um zu überleben!
CH11 Frage hängt mit der IRS und den 700 Millionen zusammen die auf eine mögliche Steuerrückzahlung geprüft werden. Wir brauchen gar nicht über die Anleihezahlung von August 2010 reden, denn die ist noch nicht angefallen, aber auch die kann Gegenstand werden damit ABK aus CH11 gehen kann.
http://services.corporate-ir.net/SEC/...tYmFjXzEwUV8yMDEwMTExNS5wZGY=
30 September 10; Angaben in Millionen:
AFG Cash: 69,673
Im Laufe der nächsten 12 Monate fallen Kosten an von:
Interest expense on long−term debt: $ 61,568
Interest on investment agreements: $ 17,175
Im August 2011 eine Anleihe über 120 Millionen (richtig micha-123)
Der Betrag um den man sich im Falle des segragated Accounts mit den Policeholder streiten betrugt Anfang des Jahres ca. 3,8 Mrd. Die Reserven belaufen sich jetzt auf 7,9 Mrd. und die Firma hat 912 Millionen an Cash.
-----
Im Falle des segragated Account sieht die SEC es nicht nötig einzuschreiten - No act.
Gave 100,000 cash bonus on Nov. 5th.
Ambac gives top lawyer pre-bankruptcy bonus
Fri, Nov 12 2010
Ambac gives top lawyer pre-bankruptcy bonus
NEW YORK Nov 12 (Reuters Legal) - Bankrupt bond insurer Ambac Financial Group awarded its top lawyer a $100,000 cash bonus for his efforts to preserve the company's cash, it said in a regulatory filing on Friday.
Ambac's board awarded the bonus to general counsel Kevin Doyle on November 5, the company said in the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filing.
It cited "his efforts to maximize the Company's cash position, thereby assisting the Company in its efforts to emerge successfully from Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings."
Ambac, which had been the second-largest U.S. bond insurer before being crushed by losses on risky mortgages, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on November 8.
An Ambac spokesman was not immediately available to comment on the decision.
The bankruptcy filing is In re Ambac Financial Group Inc, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York, No. 10-15973. Dewey LeBoeuf of New York is representing Ambac in the bankruptcy proceedings.