Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LEH)
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James Giddens sagt es sogar selber:
"James Giddens, the court-appointed trustee for the bankrupt brokerage, called the settlement "a milestone" in his efforts to recover money for the customers."
muß ja arg in den Miesen sitzen; bei dem Bestand ( oder ist er schon länger am verkaufen ); und trotzdem
jammert er nicht rum und bleibt ganz ruhig. Echt cool der Typ.
Grüße
LG: Teras.
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Wertpapier: Lehman Brothers |
bereits auf Englisch gebracht worden ist:
22.04.2011
Pleitebank
JPMorgan gibt Ex-Lehman-Kunden mehr als 800 Millionen Dollar
By böl/Reuters/dpa:
"New York - Es ist eine beachtliche Summe, auch wenn sie nicht alle Schäden abdeckt: Die US-Großbank JPMorgan Chase wird 861 Millionen Dollar an ehemalige Kunden des in der Finanzkrise kollabierten Instituts Lehman Brothers zurückgeben. Der von einem Gericht bestellte Treuhänder James Giddens nannte die Einigung am Donnerstag einen Meilenstein in seinen Bemühungen, Geld für die ehemaligen Kunden einzutreiben. Die Einigung muss allerdings noch vom zuständigen Konkursrichter gebilligt werden.
JPMorgan wird den Betrag zu einem Großteil aus Rückstellungen zahlen, die das Institut EXTRA zu diesem Zweck GEBILDET hatte. [Nur] DESHALB werde die Rückgabe keinen wesentlichen Einfluss auf die Geschäftszahlen der Bank haben, erklärte JPMorgan.
Das Finanzinstitut gehörte zu den engsten Geschäftspartnern von Lehman Brothers;
es wickelte milliardenschwere Wertpapiergeschäfte im Auftrag der Bank ab. Als Lehman zusammenbrach, war strittig, wem das verbliebene Vermögen gehört. Die Summe soll unter den Kunden aufgeteilt werden, die beim Zusammenbruch des Hauses im September 2008 ihr Geld verloren hatten.
Die Insolvenzverwalter von LEHMAN Brothers kämpfen an mehreren Fronten, um den Geschädigten ihr Geld zurückzugeben. Die Muttergesellschaft Lehman Brothers Holdings hat JPMorgan Chase auf Schadenersatz von 8,6 Milliarden Dollar verklagt. Die Summe habe die Großbank dem kriselnden Institut kurz vor dem Kollaps abgepresst, lautet der Vorwurf. JPMorgan weist dies zurück"...
SOURCE / LINK / QUELLE dieses Ausschnitts:
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/0,1518,758726,00.html
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welche auswirkungen könnte es in der zukunft für den kurs lehmq geben ?!
Eine Curs-Prognose erscheint mir extrem SCHWIERIG; dafür ist das derzeitige VOLUMEN einfach zu dünn.
LG: Teras.
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Wertpapier: Lehman Brothers |
verkaufen werd ich entweder gar nicht (totalverlust) oder zu einstelligen euro-kursen. so einfach halt ich die sache mit lehmq.
Frage: Gäbs hier eine kursrakete bei zusage für Lehman/Paulson inso-plan? Wenn, warum?!
Grüße
Filed under: Economic Policy, Boardroom, Government & Politics
A recent FDIC report on Lehman Brothers’s financial condition before its failure puts in doubt the Federal Reserve’s account of its decision- making, and raises significant questions about the nature of the financial crisis.
As we all know, the 2008 financial crisis began in earnest when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. It has always been a question why Lehman was allowed to fail when Bear Stearns—a smaller firm—was rescued with $30 billion of Federal Reserve financial support to JP Morgan Chase. Questions were even more pointed when the Fed rescued AIG only days after it let Lehman descend into bankruptcy. Now the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has shed its own light on the issue. In a report last week, the FDIC claimed that the losses would have been far smaller than initially estimated if Lehman Brothers had received government financial support to avert its bankruptcy and eventually been wound down or sold.
The trigger for the financial crisis, in other words, appears to have been the market’s loss of confidence in a solvent firm.After the calamitous market reaction to Lehman’s failure in September 2008, the Treasury Department and the Fed initially argued that the Fed did not have the legal authority to rescue Lehman. This turned out to be a bit of obfuscation when a Fed lawyer testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that it was only necessary for the Fed’s Board of Governors to have adopted an appropriate resolution. In his testimony to the FCIC, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke did not dispute this fact, but said it would not have been responsible to rescue Lehman because it was so far under water that the Fed would simply have been throwing good money after bad. “There was not nearly enough collateral to provide enough liquidity to meet the run [on Lehman]. The company would fail anyway, and the Federal Reserve would be left holding this very illiquid collateral, a very large amount of it.” In other words, the Fed did not save Lehman the way it saved Bear because Lehman simply did not have enough available collateral to protect the Fed against losses if it attempted, with liquidity support, to stop the run.
In its new report, however, the FDIC claims that if it had been able to use the resolution powers later granted under the Dodd-Frank Act, losses to Lehman’s creditors would have been limited to three cents on the dollar—far less than the losses Bernanke had suggested. Given the uncertainties associated with the facts of the Lehman case and the FDIC’s own inexperience with resolving nonbank financial institutions, one should take this estimate with a large grain of salt.
The FDIC’s contention that Lehman’s creditors would have lost only three cents on the dollar again calls into question the U.S. government’s decision to let Lehman fail.Still, if it is anywhere close to reality, the FDIC’s contention that Lehman’s creditors would have lost only three cents on the dollar again calls into question the U.S. government’s decision to let Lehman fail. Clearly, after Bear Stearns’s rescue, the financial markets were assuming that the United States would rescue all larger firms. This was confirmed by Anton Valukas’s report as an examiner for the U.S. bankruptcy court. Most market participants, he reported, including Lehman, could not imagine why the Fed would rescue Bear Stearns and not Lehman. When Lehman was allowed to fail, market participants realized that they did not know who would survive and who would not. A massive panic ensued as financial institutions hoarded cash.
Indeed, in the Valukas and FDIC accounts, Lehman does not look like the basket case Bernanke portrayed. According to the Valukas report, Lehman had raised at least $10 billion dollars in additional capital in April and June 2008, and the FDIC noted that in September 2008—the month Lehman filed for bankruptcy—the firm had equity and subordinated debt of $35 billion. It also had $50 to $70 billion in impaired assets of questionable value, most of which had been identified by the diligence examinations of various suitors. Assuming a loss ratio of 60 to 80 percent on these assets, the FDIC estimated that Lehman in liquidation would have lost about $5 billion.
When Lehman was allowed to fail, market participants realized that they did not know who would survive and who would not. A massive panic ensued as financial institutions hoarded cash.The difference between the FDIC and the Fed about the financial condition of Lehman before its failure is no small matter. It not only puts in doubt the Fed’s account of its decision-making, but it also raises significant questions about the nature of the financial crisis. If Lehman’s creditors would have lost only 3 percent in a liquidation, the firm might actually have been solvent as a going concern. As difficult as it is to imagine, the trigger for the financial crisis, in other words, could have been the market’s loss of confidence in a solvent firm.
The financial crisis was triggered by the meltdown of the U.S. housing bubble, which in turn caused the collapse of the market for mortgage-backed securities. With that market gone, mark-to-market accounting required the write-down of asset values on the balance sheets of financial institutions around the world. In many cases, these losses turned out to be temporary accounting losses. U.S. banks today are adding back into their earnings the heavy provisions that they had made for losses on mortgage-backed securities. Was the financial crisis, then, a recognition of real losses and weaknesses in the financial system—as initially portrayed—or only a world-class panic induced by investor uncertainty about the scope of housing losses, made worse by a series of major policy-maker errors?
Maximilian Coreth, hired as a managing director of the Lehman Brothers Inc. brokerage's fixed income division in April 2008, was granted a base salary of $200,000 and a bonus of $9.8 million for each of 2008 and 2009, according to court documents. If dismissed without cause, he was entitled to two years' bonuses totaling $19.6 million.
A U.S. court confirmed that London-based Barclays wouldn't be subjected to so-called successor liability when it bought the defunct firm's North American business in 2008, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge James Peck wrote in February as he dismissed Coreth's suit. Lehman filed the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history in September 2008.
Offering jobs to Coreth and another ex-Lehman employee, "Barclays states that as a Barclays employee, you will continue to receive your current base salary or applicable commission based remuneration," the judge wrote. "Barclays did not make any commitment in either of the e-mails offering employment to make any bonus payment or assume any obligation arising under any LBI employment contract."
Michael O'Looney, a Barclays spokesman, declined to comment on the appeal, made in U.S. District Court in New York.
Time on Job
Coreth, who joined Lehman from Morgan Stanley, worked for Barclays from September 2008 to October 2008, when he was fired, according to his 2009 lawsuit. The bank "repudiated its severance obligations" in agreeing to pay severance of $1,960,000, which was about one-tenth of the amount promised by Lehman, he said in the suit.
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The two sides made written submissions to the court, where Lehmans' administrators are battling to defend an insolvency principle that creditors should be treated equally.
Further reading
Lehmans halts Premier League court battle
How Lehmans could soothe the taxman's football woes
Lehman Brothers' administrators return further £2.1bn The Premier League is fighting against the taxman on the same issue. HMRC is trying to remove the super-creditor status afforded to players and managers of insolvent football clubs, status that allows them to be paid ahead of all other creditors including HMRC.
A court battle between the Premier League and HMRC was halted earlier this year to await the Supreme Court ruling, which is likely to affect the outcome.
A spokesman for the taxman said: "Both HMRC and the Premier League were given permission to intervene in the Supreme Court proceedings and made written submissions to the Court."
Lehman's US administrators are pitched against a consortium of investors arguing that its contract confers super-creditor status.
The Premier League is fighting against the taxman in court on a similar issue. However, that case was halted earlier this year to await the Supreme Court ruling, which is likely to affect the outcome.
HMRC launched the legal claim last May to overturn the football creditor rule – which prioritises the payment of players, managers and clubs in the event of a club entering administration – because it believes the rule is "unlawful".
The taxman is an unsecured creditor, so is paid after secured creditors such as lenders; the football creditor rule means that unsecured creditors are less likely to receive a return.
The Lehman Brothers case has concluded and judgment is expected later this year.
A slice of lime in the soda» See all analysis and opinionThe scandalous Lehman CME auction
inShare.It was one of the least transparent and most underpriced asset sales since the days of Russian privatizations. In the chaos of the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the CME Group auctioned off Lehman’s derivatives assets for less than half their value — handing a $1.2 billion windfall to Barclays, DRW Trading, and — you knew this was coming — Goldman Sachs.
The details are in pages 319-328 of the newly-unredacted Valukas report, and Andrew Clavell has a good summary: essentially Barclays walked away with $335 million, DRW made $303 million, and Goldman, coming out on top as always, managed to profit to the tune of $450 million.
Valukas concludes:
The bulk sale process resulted in a substantial loss to LBI exceeding $1.2 billion over the close‐of‐business liabilities associated with the positions… This process represented the first and only time the CME had conducted a forced transfer/liquidation of a clearing memberʹs positions…
Thus, LBI may have a colorable claim against CME, or any of the firms that bought LBI’s positions at a steep discount during the liquidation ordered by the CME, for the losses that LBI sustained as a result of the forced sale of house positions held for the benefit of LBI and its affiliates.
The smelly thing here is the way the auction was conducted. Not only was the whole thing utterly unprecedented, it was also far from transparent: only six firms were invited to bid. If the CME was actively trying to get the lowest possible bids it’s hard to think how they could have done better than this, holding a hurried auction in the midst of utter market chaos, with no minimum bids and seemingly not a care in the world about whether Lehman was getting a fair price for its assets. It looks very much as though the CME wanted to hand Lehman spoils to its largest clients, since Lehman itself was clearly not going to be a client going forwards and was in no position to object.
The craziest deal is the Goldman one:
Goldman Sachs assumed the equity positions cleared through the CME, as of close of business on Wednesday, in consideration for the transfer to Goldman Sachs of $445,132,487 from LBI’s margin and collateral deposits at the CME. The equity positions included options with a net option value of $4,867,513 so the amount transferred to Goldman Sachs exceeded the Wednesday close of business position liabilities associated with the positions by $450 million.
In other words, Lehman’s equity-derivatives positions were worth $4.9 million. And Goldman, in bidding for those positions, didn’t bid a single penny — instead, it demanded a whopping $445 million from Lehman’s margin accounts in order to take them over. So it got the positions for free, and another $445 million as gravy, on top. You can almost see the money being sucked up the Goldman blood funnel, no?