Ambac Rocky Balboa oder chapter 11

http://www.cnbc.com/id/41844055  

http://www.businessinsider.com/...s-wall-streets-ponzi-machine-2011-3

 

Der größte US-Anleihenversicherer MBIA schreibt wieder schwarze Zahlen und überrascht damit Analysten.

Wie  das Unternehmen am Dienstag nach Börsenschluss mitteilte, betrug der  Nettogewinn im vierten Quartal 451 Millionen Dollar nach einem Verlust  von 240 Millionen Dollar zum Vorjahr.

Je Aktie ergab dies einen  Gewinn von 2,24 Dollar. Analysten hatten durchschnittlich mit einem  Verlust je Aktie von 27 Cent gerechnet.

Als Grund für das unerwartet gute Ergebnis führte MBIA einen starken Anstieg bei versicherten Derivaten an.

www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/versicherungen/...ahlen/3899464.html

Und dies steckt hinter dem Resultat

The results in the latest quarter were driven by a $1.1 billion  unrealized net gain on the fair value of insured derivatives that  resulted from the reversal of the mark-to-market on commuted  transactions. Not including that gain, the net loss for the quarter was  $310.9 million. finance.yahoo.com/news/MBIA-posts-4Q-profit-on-apf-3875559378.html

MBIA stopped writing insurance on those kinds of structured securities in 2008.

For  the fourth quarter, MBIA said total premiums earned slipped to $144.5  million, down from $158.5 million in the year ago period. Net investment  income was $115.4 million, down from $122.6 million. Fees and  reimbursements were $11.6 million, down from $90.2 million.

 

IRS hat  beim Reh. Prozess wahrscheinlich ihre Nerven total verloren,weil ihr Gegenantrag zweimal abgeleht worden sind.

Diesmal IRS hat nicht nur OCI sondern  Wisconsin State Circuit Court for Dane County auch angeklagt.

IRS's Appearance and Docketing Statement

----------------------------

und die OCI oppotionen gegen den IRS Antrags;

OCI's Opposition to IRS's Motion to Consolidate Appeals

-------------------------------------------------

Ausserdem Depfa und  Lloyds Policyholders haben der Einspruch gegen das Reh. Plan, deren Ansprüche  bei dem Reh. Prozess mehrmals abgeleht worden sind. Sie haben nicht soviel chance gegen  OCI. Ich glaube, Sie werden sich mit OCI einigen, wie LVM policyholders!

ALL/Lloyds’ Notice of Appeal, Docketing Statement and Attachment

Depfa’s Notice of Appeal of Plan Confirmation Order

 

 

könnten uns die guten zahlen von mbia kurstechnisch nicht etwas nach oben ziehen???  

könnten uns die guten zahlen von mbia kurstechnisch nicht etwas nach oben ziehen???  

Natürlich mann kann erwarten. Aber der Kurs pendelt sich zwischen den 0,175 -0,275 us cent, solange die Problematik mit IRS nicht gelöst ist.

 

danke für deine einschätzung! ich hoffe auch die problematik mit IRS wird sich für uns zum positiven wenden. es bleibt also dabei weiterhin geduldig zu sein und abzuwarten.  

In Deutschland wärst du bei der nächsten Instanz nur unter gewissen vorgaben und dann war´s das. In den USA kann man aber wohl 100000 mal gegen etwas Einspruch erheben, bis einem das Urteil passt. Mich nervt das, wer zwei mal mit seinen Einspruch abgeblitzt ist, der soll endlich die Fresse halten - hier die IRS - und nach Hause gehen.  

http://ambacpolicyholders.com/court-filings/


Strong buy !!  

Dark side of American bank consolidation exposed
http://blogs.reuters.com/columns/2011/03/01/...consolidation-exposed/

Sogar das FBI und die Cops hängen in dem Hypotheken Betrug.
http://www.ticklethewire.com/2011/03/02/...-trial-for-mortgage-fraud/

Bank of America Settles Countrywide Financial Case
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/...ountrywide-case/?src=dlbksb  

besser nicht, guck dir doch mal den kurs von mbia an, 7% aber mi.us.

@marlboromann
ist da ein uebersetzu.gsfehler in der news oder sind die amis einfach nur seltsam?  

Hauptargument:

this court should decide whether it has jurisdiction over the first appel before deciding the united states motion to consolidate the two appeals

http://ambacpolicyholders.com/storage/...%20Consolidate%202-28-11.pdf Seite 4

dieses Gericht sollte entscheiden, ob es zuständig ist gegenüber dem ersten Appel, bevor die Vereinigten Staaten Bewegung auf die beiden Beschwerden konsolidieren  

Anscheind  hat IRS ihre Hoffnung beim Wisconsin Reh. Gericht aufgegeben.

Diesmal sie versucht ihre Chance beim US courth for the seventh circuit Chicago, bei dem vorher eine Memorandum über diesen Streit  vorgelegt worden ist.

IRS’s Reply in Support of Motion to Consolidate Appeals

- Wir brauchen noch eine Ablehnung von ihrer Klage oder US courth for the seventh circuit Chicago soll IRS antrags nicht annehmen nur einfach wieder an wisconsin Reh. court  zurückzuschicken!

Dann wird es wunderbar.

 

besser nicht, guck dir doch mal den kurs von mbia an, 7% aber mi.us.

 

Leider der MBIAs Gewinn ist nicht der wahre Gewinn! Profis wissen das!

 

http://ih.advfn.com/p.php?pid=squote&symbol=ABKFQ  

Das Gericht soll jetz ein Machtwortsprechen und endlich mal sagen wer den nun zuständig ist für den Steitprozeß mit der IRS und dann kann man weiter sehen. Sollte das Gericht nun eindeutig festlegen das nur das Gericht das bis jetzt die IRS-Einsprüche abgelehnt hat dafür zuständig sein, dann kann die IRS nicht mehr klagen, wiel sie den Einspruch schon abgelehnt hatten.  

http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/...e-looking-glass-with-ambac/

If the claims by the Internal Revenue Service are true, Ambac has managed to pull off something that Lehman Brothers could not: force the government to provide a bailout. Ambac got its bailout by receiving more than $700 million in tax refunds that the I.R.S. now argues were unwarranted.

This involuntary bailout is just the latest twist in a rather odd case that seems to also involve Ambac’s insurance subsidiary committing a fraudulent transfer against itself, and generally paying off one group of investors in mortgage-backed securities, while telling another group of mortgage-backed securities investors to pound sand.

I told you it was odd.

Start with the basics. Ambac Financial Group is the New York parent company of the Ambac Assurance Corporation, as Wisconsin insurance company. For many years Ambac was a boring municipal bond insurer. Then, in a story that was repeated throughout the industry, Ambac decided it wanted better profit margins.

So Ambac Assurance wrote some insurance policies to backstop collateralized debt obligations, enabling the C.D.O.’s to obtain higher credit ratings, since Ambac was all about its high credit rating. Next, because insurance is regulated by state insurance commissioners who frown on writing more policies than a company has the ability to pay, an Ambac Assurance subsidiary also wrote many, many credit default swap contracts that supported C.D.O.’s.

Note the similarities between the insurance contracts written by the insurance company and the swap contracts written by the subsidiary: Both promise that if the pool of mortgages underlying the C.D.O.’s falter, Ambac will be on the hook for the shortfall. The only difference is which piece of Ambac is on the hook, with the insurance policies coming from a regulated insurance company, while the swap contracts came from the lightly regulated subsidiary.

And, appropriately for this looking glass case, it’s the unregulated swap creditors who are getting paid and the insurance policyholders who are not. This is also where the I.R.S. comes in with its involuntary bailout.

As with many of these monoline insurers, and with the American International Group, when the mortgage market began to falter, Ambac began to experience problems as it looked like it might actually have to pay up on all those insurance policies and swap contracts.

Ambac’s first step was to put all of its “bad stuff” into a segregated account – an entity under Wisconsin insurance law that apparently acts like a separate subsidiary of the insurance company, without actually being separate in any corporate law sense of the word.

Crucial among the bad stuff was all the insurance policies written to backstop the C.D.O.’s. And then this segregated account was placed into an insurance insolvency proceeding in Wisconsin, complete with an “automatic stay”-like injunction against creditors. Kind of like filing for bankruptcy for half of a company.

Meanwhile, Ambac Financial, the parent company, had claimed and received a $700 million tax refund from the I.R.S. on behalf of Ambac as a whole. And, of course, the I.R.S.’s claim to get the refund back was among the things included with the “bad stuff” that was in insolvency in Wisconsin. And just to make matters more complicated, the parent company then filed a Chapter 11 petition in New York.

In short, the parent company and part of the insurance subsidiary are in insolvency proceedings, and protected from creditors.

The one group that is sitting pretty are the swap creditors of Ambac who are not covered by any insolvency proceeding. Ambac Assurance has agreed to pay them a nice package of cash and notes.

So with the aid of the Wisconsin insurance regulators, Ambac Assurance has shed its C.D.O. policies and settled with the swap creditors. But the Wisconsin regulators have also facilitated Ambac’s recapitalization with $700 million of the federal government’s money, arguing that the part of Ambac Assurance that is not in insolvency can’t be held liable, since the I.R.S. is part of the “bad stuff” on the insolvency side of line.

So when the dust settles, the swap counterparties get paid, the municipal bond creditors get saved, and the I.R.S. and C.D.O. insurance policyholders, who wish they had called their contracts credit default swaps, get left holding the bag. Pretty neat, in a cynical sort of way.

For those of you who prefer a picture to my thousand words, this is all diagrammed in a helpful slide that comes courtesy of William Goddard at Bingham McCutchen.

SlideShow und mehr unter dem Link http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/...e-looking-glass-with-ambac/  

http://www.scribd.com/full/...495?access_key=key-2j0zwk34ckcm1wkxhm4p

 

was meint ihr denn hiezu???
danke für eure antworten!

aus dem YAHOO-B.


2010 Geschäftsberichte     2-Mar-11 19.31    
2010 Ambac Assurance Gesetzliche Surplus = $ 1026920181
http://www.ambac.com/pdfs/Statutory/Amba ...

2010 Ambac Assurance (Getrennte) Gesetzliche Surplus = $ 50.179.095
http://www.ambac.com/pdfs/Statutory/Amba ...

2010 Everspan Financial Gesetzliche Surplus = 177.007.791 $ http://www.ambac.com/pdfs/Statutory/Ever ...

$ 1254000000 Total Gesetzliche Überschuss am Ende des Jahres 2010.  

 

 

Ja der Segregated Account hat $ 50,179.095 an Gewinn erwirtschaftet.  

Everpsan FGC. betreibt als Connie Lee Insurance Company in Virgina ihr Geschäft
--------------------------------------------------

Everspan Assets 2011 = $ 201.490.198

Gewinn von Everspan 2011 = $ 177.007.791

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Hier stimmen die Zahlen, aber ich weiß jetzt nicht mehr ob Everspan zur AAC oder nicht zur AAC und damit nur noch zur AFG (AMBAC Holding) gehört! Mit der Zeit kommt man da schon mal durcheinander.
Es hat aber den Anschein als hätte man es geschafft Everspan wieder zu beleben.  

Dieser Satz ist seine Behaptung;

"Note the similarities between the insurance contracts written by the  insurance company and the swap contracts written by the subsidiary: Both  promise that if the pool of mortgages underlying the C.D.O.’s falter,  Ambac will be on the hook for the shortfall. The only difference is  which piece of Ambac is on the hook, with the insurance policies coming  from a regulated insurance company, while the swap contracts came from  the lightly regulated subsidiary.

And, appropriately for this  looking glass case, it’s the unregulated swap creditors who are getting  paid and the insurance policyholders who are not. This is also where the  I.R.S. comes in with its involuntary bailout.

As with many of  these monoline insurers, and with the American International Group, when  the mortgage market began to falter, Ambac began to experience problems  as it looked like it might actually have to pay up on all those  insurance policies and swap contracts."

Er meinte, einige CDS sind unregulary und mit den CDO Verbindung worden zu sein.

-Ein Kommentator hat Gegenargumente dafür;

This is factually wrong in so many ways it is laughable.  For example,  all CDOs were "insured" via CDS with an insurance policy backstop from  the insurance operating company.  That is, all risk was resident in the  insurance company nothwithstanding that the CDS were written by an  affiliate. The CDO counterparties that settled were paid pennies on the  dollar for their claims. The policy holders in the segregated account  that have current claims are generally RMBS holders that have already  recieved billions in claims payments.  The need to segregate these  policies is because they were draining the insurance company of cash at  an incredible rate.  The policy holders in the segregated account are  complaining becuase they are being made to wait for full payment until  gross liabilities are more settled.  I guaranty you that if you offered  the RMBS policy holders the same settlement as the CDO counterparties  took they would reject it as too small.  They want to remain at the head  of the line (in front of longer dated muni and CDO risks until all cash  is gone.

 

 

http://www.zacks.com/research/get_news.php?id=062l7552