Ambac Rocky Balboa oder chapter 11

Steht den irgendwo auf wann er verschoben wurde, oder ist das der, der am Montag dann jetzt?

 

Steht den irgendwo auf wann er verschoben wurde, oder ist das der, der am Montag dann jetzt?

 

Nein.sogar seit 15.2  war die Verschiebung bekannt.  Niemand hat richtig gechekt und niemand hat meinen Fehler korrigiert  leider!

nächste Hearing beim Wisconsin Gericht  ist am 21.4 aber für die Sache von LVM policyholder

http://ambacpolicyholders.com/hearing-notices/

Bitte immer die gegebenen infos 2 oder 3 mal überprüfen,ob es richtig oder falsch ist! egal von wem kommt!

 

Das könnte auch erklären, warum der kurs wieder so eingebrochen war. Die denken lieber erstmal wo anders Geld verdienen, hier steht dann ja erstmal nix an.

 

Bußgelder für Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Aktionen auf Zwangsvollstreckungen

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-26/...ions-on-foreclosures.html

 

http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/board.aspx?board_id=11069#

 

Das ist der Termin für ein Schlichtungsgespräch, wenn ich mich nicht irre.
Da wir bis jetzt kein Ergebnis haben, bewerte ich dies als das die Gespräche noch im Gange sind. Wenn die Annahme richtig ist, dann bedeutet dies nur das beide Seiten Gespräch bereit sind.  

http://www.istockanalyst.com/finance/story/...ancial-firms-don-t-scam

 

 

1. In mid-2006, Bear Stearns induced investors to purchase,  and Ambac as a financial guarantor to insure, securities that were  backed by a pool of mortgage loans that in the words of the Bear Stearns  deal manager was a SACK OF SHIT.1 Within the walls of its sparkling new  office tower, Bear Stearns executives knew this derogatory and  distasteful characterization aptly described the transaction. Indeed, Bear Stearns had deliberately and secretly altered its policies and neglected its controls to increase the volume of mortgage loans available for its securitizations made in patent disregard for the borrowers ability to repay those loans. After the market collapse exposed its scheme to sell defective loans to investors through these transactions, JP  Morgan executives assumed control over Bear Stearns and implemented an  across-the-board strategy to improperly bar EMC from honoring its  contractual promises to disclose and repurchase defective loans through a  series of deceptive practices. In what amounts to accounting fraud, JP Morgans bad-faith strategy was  designed to avoid and has avoided recognition of the vast off-balance  sheet exposure relating to its contractual repurchase obligations thereby enabling JPMorgan Chase & Co. to manipulate  its accounting reserves and allowing its senior executives to continue  to reap tens of millions of dollars in compensation following the  taxpayer-financed acquisition of Bear Stearns.

Oh, maybe they did.

At least that's what the lawsuit claims.

It's especially nice when you make crap loans and then short the companies you intentionally lay off the bad paper on, knowing they'll blow up in advance.  And that's alleged too:

24. Knowing that its fraudulent and breaching conduct was resulting and would continue to result in grave harm to Ambac,  Bear Stearns then implemented a trading strategy to profit from Ambacs  potential demise by shorting banks with large exposure to Ambac-insured  securities. (The shorts were bets the banks shares or holdings would decrease in value as Ambac incurred additional harm.) In late 2007, Bear,  Stearns & Co. Senior Managing Director Jeffrey Verschleiser boasted  that (a)t the end of October, while presenting to the risk committee on  our business I told them that a few financial guarantors were  vulnerable to potential write downs in the CDO and MBS market and we  should be short a multiple of 10 of the shorts I had put on . . .

 

In less than three weeks we made approximately $55 million on just these  two trades.31 Bolstered by this success, Bear Stearns carried this  trading strategy into 2008. On February 17, 2008, a Bear Stearns trader  told colleagues and Verschleiser, I am positive fgic is done and ambac  is not far behind.32

Nice.

But wait, as Billy Mayes used to say, there's more!

JP Morgan caused EMC to reject legitimate repurchase demands by Ambac, as well as other financial guaranty insurers, to  understate materially the accounting reserves JPMorgan Chase & Co.  was required to accrue and disclose in its financial statements to  reflect the liability inherited from EMC for repurchase obligations  associated with defective loans. JP Morgan thus interfered with  EMCs contractual obligations to Ambac (and other insurers) to assist  its parent corporation, JP Morgan Chase, effectuate a massive  accounting fraud. JP Morgan interfered fraudulently, and deceptively  represented to Ambac that the rejections of Ambacs repurchase demands  were based on the reasons set forth in the written responses to the  demands. In fact, JP Morgan itself had concluded, and knew that EMC and  Bear Stearns & Co. (prior to JP Morgan taking control of Bear  Stearns & Co.) previously had concluded, that the bases for the  repurchase demands for a substantial portion of challenged loans were  well founded. Indeed, in a number of instances, EMC had made  repurchase demands on the originators of the loans for the very same  reason(s) Ambac cited in support of its repurchase demands to EMC.

But I thought Jamie Dimon has repeatedly told us that JP  Morgan was a very ethical company, and never did anything wrong?  Ambac  disagrees.

27. Moreover, even while refusing to repurchase breaching  loans that Ambac identified and requested, the same JP Morgan executive  implemented a policy of demanding that suppliers repurchase from EMC the  same loans, for the same reasons that Ambac and other financial  guarantors had requested EMC to repurchase.36 JP Morgan rebuffed Ambacs  repurchase requests even where Bear Stearns had previously demanded that originators repurchase the exact same loans because  the same or similar defects subsequently identified by Ambac.37 The  duplicitous and deceptive conduct is patent and the motivation clear: JP  Morgan adopted a strategy to deliberately and systematically deny the  financial guarantors legitimate repurchase demands to avoid JPMorgan  Chase & Co. from bringing onto its financial statements the massive  off-balance sheet exposure and, in doing so, effectively engaged in accounting fraud.

You know all those off-balance sheet games that I have been screaming about for four years now?  The same sort of games that took Enron down the toilet, and which you can find in virtually every major financial institution in The United States in one form or another?

Yes, those. 

We still allow this to be done in the United States..... why?

After conducting the initial review noted above, Ambac  reviewed a random sample of 1,482 loans, with an aggregate principal  balance of approximately $88.2 million, selected across all four  Transactions. The results of that review are remarkable. Of these 1,482  loans, 1,351, or over 91%, breached one or more of the representations and warranties that EMC had made to Ambac.

91% of the Chocolates in the box are really used  dog food, but nobody has gone to jail for selling adulterated boxes of  Chocolate.

WHY?

Full complaint below, and again: Where are the damned handcuffs?

Komplett unter www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewarticlepaged/...id/4925053/pageid/1

 

konnte nicht widerstehen. Alles, Nichts oder nun!  

http://www.royalgazette.com/article/20110228/...2289943/-1/business04

BofA’s Laughlin Squeezed by Mortgage Investors, Regulators

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-02-28/...estors-regulators.html

 

Es deutet so an, weil ambac am 25.02 ihre einstweilige Verfügung( gerichtliche Verfügung so ein art Unterlassung Klage) gegen IRS beim CH11 Gericht zurückgenommen hat.

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/1015973/1015973110225000000000004.pdf

,obwohl am 23.2 Termin beim wisconsin Reh. Gericht ist .

D.h die Problematik mit IRS ist das gleiche Thema sowohl beim CH11 als auch beim Wisconsin Reh. Gericht.

Es gibt zwei Optionen;

1- OCI wartet auf das Ergebnis der Vermittlung zwischen den IRS und Ambac auf. ( beim CH 11 Gericht und Dann reagiert  es)

2- oder gleichzeitig führt das parallele Gespräche mit IRS

 

hat einer realtime chart,meiner funzt nicht mehr  

http://ih.advfn.com/...rt&s=NO%5EabkfQ&p=0&t=16&vol=1  

 

http://www.businessinsider.com/...-david-einhorn-shorts-stocks-2011-2

 

 

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/1015973/1015973110228000000000001.pdf

ORDERED that the Motion is granted to the extent provided herein; and it is
further
ORDERED that, pursuant to section 1121(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the
Debtor’s Exclusive Filing Period is extended 120 days through and including July 6, 2011; and it
is further

ORDERED that, pursuant to section 1121(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the
Debtor’s Exclusive Solicitation Period is extended 120 days through and including September 6,
2011; and it is further

ORDERED that this Order shall be without prejudice to the Debtor’s right to seek
additional extensions of the Exclusive Periods; and it is further

ORDERED that this Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to all matters
arising from or related to the implementation of this Order.

 

Dated: February 28, 2011
New York, New York
/S/ Shelley C. Chapman
THE HONORABLE SHELLEY C. CHAPMAN
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

 

 

http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/...o-45-billion-in-additional-legal-losses

http://nachrichten.finanztreff.de/...2917904,sektion,unternehmen.html  

http://www.forexyard.com/en/news/...peals-court-2011-02-28T185356Z-US

 

Erst bis zum 6. Juni und dann später,

wenn es nötigt ist, kann man bis zum 6. september und hinaus verlängern.

Richterin S.Chapman ist nicht dagegen. Diese Option ist noch offen!

 

That cut off date should shed more light on the Creditors' Claims......

 

Aus dem ami Forum:

Looks like we had income of about $95M. Equity holders deficit dropped. This is well worth a read as they tend to change month over month an dcan include some nice tidbits.

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/1015973/1015973110228000000000662.pdf

 

der bzw. die nächste bitte!!!!

Goldman Sachs Estimates `Reasonably Possible' Legal Losses at $3.4 Billion
By Christine Harper -
Mar 1, 2011 12:27 PM GMT+0100

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-01/...cases-at-3-4-billion.html  

http://www.world-of-stocks.com/rt_data/abk