Fannie Mae - Chance auf Verdreifachung bis Juli
Droht hier durch die FHFA ein "Squeeze-out" ?
https://seekingalpha.com/article/...annie-and-freddie-preferred-trade
(aus den Kommentaren)
deepL + edit (Hervorhebungen von mir)
Arkham
24 Jun. 2021, 6:43 PM
Comments
Mnuchin hinterließ die GSE's in einem Übergangszustand - nur eine Kapitalerhöhung entfernt vom Ausstieg aus der Zwangsverwaltung und dem Schutz der Aufsichtsbehörde. Biden hat es zwar "nicht eilig", die GSEs freizugeben, aber er feuerte Calabria noch am selben Tag, an dem Scotus entschied. Biden hat es nicht eilig, aber wenn er nicht seine Parameter (EK-Regeln und KE-Bedingungen) festlegt und FnF unter seinen Bedingungen freigibt, was effektiv die zukünftige Wohnungspolitik stark beeinflusst, dann werden es (später) die Republikaner mit ihren Parametern tun, wenn sie gewinnen.
(Anmerkung A.L.: Denn auch die Reps können jetzt sofort nach einer gewonnenen Präsidentschafts-Wahl sofort einen neuen FHFA-Direktor ernennen, und sie werden die Freilassung dann eher so gestalten, dass FnF in ihrem Volumen beschnitten werden....)
Und nach einem Ende der Zwangsverwaltung wird die FHFA nicht mehr in der Lage sein, viel an FnF zu verändern - vor allem, wenn sich die Twins [nach der KE größtenteils] im Besitz eines Haufens großer Staatsfonds (A.L.: Sovereign Wealth funds) befinden, welche die einzige Investorengruppe zu sein scheint, die schnell solche enormen Mengen an Kapital [für die KE] bereitstellen kann.
Wenn Biden also [selber] die GSEs rekapitalisiert, legt er seine Vision des Wohnungsbaus für eine lange Zeit fest, und die Republikaner können [später] nur kleinere Dinge schrittweise ändern, da es eine enge LOA (Briefvereinbarung) nach dem Ausstieg geben wird, um die Bedingungen zu zementieren....
....Große Fonds legen die Bedingungen fest, und boom - es ist die Demokraten-Vision von US-Housing. Die Demokraten haben Calabria gefeuert, der der einzige [Bremser war.] Viel Glück [wünsche ich denen, die glauben,] Biden werde diese Gelegenheit verstreichen lassen. Es wird mit Null Warnung kommen. Genau wie Obamas NWS.
Original:
Mnuchin left GSE's in transitional state, with a capital raise away from exiting conservatorship and conservatorship protection. While Biden was in no rush to release GSE's, he fired Calabria the day Scotus ruled. He is not in a rush, but unless he sets his parameters and recaps and releases them under his terms, effectively dictating housing policy going forward, repubs will do it with their parameters when they win. And post exit from c-ship, FHFA will not be able to do much to their regulated entities, especially if they are owned by a bunch of Sovereign Wealth funds, who seem to be the only group that can recap on the spot. So if Biden recaps GSE's, he locks in his vision of housing for a long time, and repubs can only change minor things incrementally as there will be a tight LOA post exit to cement the terms. And you somehow believe Dems will punt this like repubs holding Trump down from setting his vision of housing? Biden doesn't need the Congress now with what Mnuchin did. Big funds lock down the terms after exit, and boom, it's Dem's vision of the housing. And Repubs fired Calabria that was the only block to full Dem remake of the housing. Good luck with Biden passing this opportunity. It will be done with zero warning. Like Obama's NWS.
Ein gutes Beispiel für (ahnungsloses bzw. "unbedarftes" Kursdrücken ist der Artikel in # 410.
Konkret zu deiner Frage:
Die Stammaktien werden mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit nicht wertlos werden, und ihre Halter werden nach der KE und Freilassung weiterhin an Fannie und Freddie beteiligt sein.
Bei den JPS ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass sie wertlos werden, noch kleiner.
https://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/...sg.aspx?message_id=164627090
I believe the Biden administration understands that this is its problem to fix. If it does not attempt to, its economic team will look weak and ineffective. But beyond that, Fannie and Freddie have the potential to play enormous roles in helping to meet the administration’s priorities for housing in general, and affordable housing in particular. There is no chance of any housing-related legislation getting through this Congress, so the Biden team will need to rely on the tools it has. Two of its most important ones, Fannie and Freddie, have been hamstrung (deliberately, I believe, and for ideological reasons) by the now-departed FHFA director. With support from the administration’s top policy figures, a new FHFA director could take the lead on getting Fannie and Freddie properly capitalized and regulated, canceling the net worth sweep and settling the remaining lawsuits, and creating a path for the companies to quickly and safely exit conservatorship, thus putting them back in their traditional roles of buoying the economy by making mortgage credit more available and affordable to a wide range of low- moderate- and middle-income homebuyers. While this may not happen for a while, I am confident that it will at some point. And if it does, then last week’s unexpected Supreme Court ruling will have been only a temporary setback for the homebuyers who benefit from Fannie and Freddie financing, and the investors who must provide the new capital that will make this financing possible.
erschienen auch auf Seeking Alpha:
https://seekingalpha.com/article/...takings-scotus-says-fhfa-can-take
Autor: Glen Bradford
(Hervorhebungen von mir)
Als erstes nennt Bradford die politische Lösung (siehe # 427 + 429), die auch ich für die zielführendste und aussichtsreichste halte.
Investment Thesis
There are five main ways to unlock value in Fannie and Freddie securities. The first is that the Biden team implements housing reform in such a way that locks in proposed reforms by tying it to a recapitalization where the warrants are put into some sort of affordable housing trust fund of sorts for policy purposes or a democrat slush fund of sorts. The second is that the constitutional claims that were won for shareholders, upgrading their claim from what the en banc provided for them, result in a financial remedy legal victory. The third is that the breach of contract claims in Judge Lamberth's court that were remanded back to him that are unaffected by the Supreme Court ruling result in a legal victory for plaintiffs. Note that the government official Mario Ugoletti reversed his claims in this case so it will be interesting to see who in the government certifies their trial record. The fourth is that the court of Federal Claims rules that this was a takings and provides backwards relief. The fifth is that the next president of the United States moves forward with recapitalization of Fannie and Freddie. The government has not yet decreased the capital buffer of Fannie and Freddie to resume the sweep of their money to Treasury. If the companies continue to retain capital and the incoming FHFA director supports a utility model, at a certain point the stock market will wake up to option 1. For all of these options above, preferred get par. Preferred currently trade at 5-9 cents on the dollar, depending on the series. I'm not sure how exactly to start thinking about common, but it is possible that with option 1, common are worth $3-7. Biden could possibly lower capital requirements, but I don't see that happening.
Option 1: Biden Moves Towards Privatization
Aside from the fear mongering [= leere Drohungen, A.L.] that everyone is doing now about Biden resuming the cash sweep payments from Fannie and Freddie to Treasury, which the Supreme court basically ruled FHFA could now do if it wanted to --- it is worth noting that the companies are still retaining their earnings on the path towards privatization. Biden just fired Calabria. If he wanted to grab Fannie and Freddie's net worth, he could make orders to cut back their capital buffers to $0 and take their money for Treasury. He has not done that yet which could signal that he is looking to get money out of these companies a different way, like exercising the warrants and/or establishing a commitment fee. Another way he could get money out would be to structure things so that more of their money goes to underprivileged and minority home ownership causes via all sorts of methods. Long story short, I still think this is a viable option. If Biden wants to be able to raise private capital, many of the shareholder lawsuits need to be settled. It's worth noting that the underwriters of the potential secondary offering for the GSEs, Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan, have not been fired by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as far as I know.
Option 2: Constitutional Claims Supreme Court Win
Somehow, people seem to forget that shareholders won the constitutional claims. These claims may lead to a large portion of the net worth sweep money being returned to the companies.
Option 3: Lamberth Breach Of Contract Claims
Mario Ugoletti wrote a signed affidavit that he later recanted that helped get the government through the first Lamberth ruling. These claims are basically that when the government arranged for the net worth sweep, they effectively trampled the capital structure violating the junior preferred shareholder contract rights as well as common shareholder rights as well. At that time in 2012, preferred shareholders would have been due their par value and 6% interest every year since then. This calculates to about 150% or more of par value for preferred which currently trades around 5-9% of par. These claims were validated by the DC District Court of Appeals and remanded back to Lamberth and plaintiffs are currently working on their damages models.
If the government wants to sit around and wait for these claims to get ruled on, it is free to do so. But if Biden is trying to make money during his term by taking it from Fannie and Freddie and he waits for this ruling, then I expect he will lose money on his choices for his first term because he will have to pay shareholders more than what he is able to take because of these contract claims specifically noting that the preferred outstanding par value is about $34B making that potential payout to preferred over $50B.
This doesn't even take into account how much money the Biden administration would lose if it bleeds Fannie and Freddie dry of their capital and then the housing market turns down and they "have to put more money into Fannie and Freddie." It's hard to know how realistic a scenario like that is because in 2008-2011 FHFA used its discretionary authority over the GSEs accounting to write down their assets under the assumption that Fannie and Freddie were going out of business. Now that guarantee fees have doubled, doing all that accounting chicanery serves no practical purpose because especially with this Supreme Court ruling, control is established. In effect, these early year accounting manipulations were not necessary based on this Supreme Court ruling. FHFA could have done the net worth sweep day 1. That said, just because FHFA can legally do whatever it wants does not mean that there are no consequences for actions like the net worth sweep and I believe the contract claims in Lamberth's court are some of the strongest claims for preferred shareholders.
Option 4: Court Of Federal Claims
These claims got upgraded by the Supreme Court ruling. The question was really whether or not the government could take Fannie and Freddie's money. I believe that if you actually read the law and know what happened here, the Supreme Court got this ruling wrong. That said, all it means is that with respect to the question, "What kind of case is this?" and the answer being either APA or Takings; the Supreme Court has solved that riddle for us. This is now a takings case. FHFA as conservator can legally according to the Supreme Court could take whatever it wants. That said, there are consequences. If the federal court takes private property, there is a court just for that. The court of federal claims is designed specifically when the government legally takes what is not theirs from private citizens. When it does this, it has to pay for it according to the takings clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, "Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
Option 5: Next President
Honestly, I don't think that it gets this far, but if Biden resumes the sweep and tries to drain Fannie and Freddie dry and the lawsuits somehow do not get resolved during the rest of his term (I expect major rulings by the end of his term), the next president of the United States could decide that Fannie and Freddie should not be run as private companies with zero capital. Or perhaps the other alternative would be Biden just has them retain earnings and otherwise does nothing, risking the mortgage market in the process, but at the end, these companies become the only private companies on earth that exit conservatorship and are adequately capitalized but the government still takes all their money. Who knows. At a certain point, the level of absurdity is mind boggling and senseless, but these are the sorts of things people have been telling me about on calls lately. I'm like sure, if you want to structure a Frankenstein zombie that is a complete freak of nature of capital structure that effectively voids the integral purpose of having capital structure to spite shareholders in the name of reasons that I don't understand, then there are conversations that you can have that don't make any sense and I think that this is what has been happening among lots of GSE investors this past week which drove relentless and in my opinion senseless selling.
Summary And Conclusion
The Supreme Court solved the problem of how to interpret the law. I think they chose wrong, but that's okay. It just means that the legal claims that matter are in a different court than what we would have expected if they would have interpreted the law differently. In effect, the claims that matter according to SCOTUS are the Takings claims in the Court of Federal Claims.
Honestly, this ruling kind of supports Calabria's unnecessarily high capital requirements framework from the perspective of since a conservator can do whatever it wants, shareholders who would buy into the utility model would want there to be a bigger than necessary amount of capital to prevent the companies from ever even being close to ever needing to be placed into conservatorship again by any metric because they know [so] that if they go into conservatorship, their conservator does not have to follow standard bankruptcy law of only being able to conserve and preserve. As such, unnecessarily high capital requirements kind of makes this investable I guess by being a necessary deterrent.
Wachter wäre mMn die beste Wahl, gefolgt von Calhoun.
Hier der Link zum PDF dieses Papiers:
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/...anieri_FINAL.pdf
Dies steht auf S. 7 des PDF:
As part of the support of the GSEs in 2008, the government received shares of preferred stock and warrants for 79.9% of their common stock. The value of these stock interests depends on several variables, including the terms and timing of recapitalization and release from conservatorship, but they are significant assets. The value of the GSE preferred stock and warrants should be used for affordable housing and racial equity programs as detailed below.
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A.L.: D.h. dieses Papier deutet bereits die politische Lösung mit Freilassung und Kapitalerhöhung an. Nur dann haben die Warrants der Regierung überhaupt einen Wert, der "abschöpfbar" wird.
Verwirrend könnte werden, dass er dieselben Intitialen hat wie Mark Calabria (MC).
Das Positions-Papier der Brookings-Institution (link in # 432) könnte daher sehr wohl die neue Marschrichtung der Regierung (Freilassung, Rekapitalisierung, Utility-Modell) vorzeichnen.
https://www.brookings.edu/author/janet-l-yellen/
Ich bleibe dabei, dass die administrative Lösung wesentlich wahrscheinlicher ist als eine juristische/legislative, und dass sie schneller kommen könnte, als viele erwarten.
https://twitter.com/UrbanKaoboy/status/1410049495547580418
Angehängte Grafik:
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https://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/...sg.aspx?message_id=164668357
Frage eines iHub-Foristen: "Any insight into how this could all play out, and how it could affect different share classes?"
Antwort von User Kthomp19:
I believe the direct claims are basically nothingburgers for anyone who isn't a named plaintiff. Class certification could change things, but only for those who held shares on September 5 2008 (Washington Federal) or current shareholders (Owl Creek and Wazee), and that's only if Sweeney's dismissals of those suits are overturned and those suits eventually result in a payout. I think that's a difficult parlay.
The derivative claims have a real chance to force Treasury to write a $125B check, and that would be a real political black eye. Two mitigating factors are that we are at least 2-3 years (trial, appeals court, petition for cert to the Supreme Court) from Treasury having to actually cut that check, and that Treasury has a way to recoup 79.9% (warrants) to 99.9% (senior pref conversion) of that money.
The Supreme Court's Collins ruling means that the senior prefs are only going to go away if Treasury wishes them to. That's going to mean a conversion to common (to recoup that $125B) rather than just a writedown with nothing in return.
The outlier case here is Perry, in Judge Lamberth's court. That case is the only one with FnF themselves as named defendants, and damages in that case would accrue to current (rather than historical) junior pref shareholders because Lamberth ruled that rights to damages travel with the shares. The plaintiffs also seek 6% of par per year since the NWS as damages, leading to a potential 150% or more for all current junior pref holders. I'm not sure how to handicap the odds of this happening (probably not great), but at least that case will have a trial next year.
Falls die US-Regierung ziemlich bald (solange die Kurse noch im Keller sind) einen Vergleich anbietet, könnte die Collins-Kläger und andere JPS-Streiter womöglich auch auch günstigere Bedingungen akzeptieren (z. B. 50 % Haircut).
KThomp19 von iHub meint allerdings, dass in dem Fall, dass die JPS einen Haircut erhielten, der Wert der Stammaktien praktisch null sei.
Dass die Stammaktien auf Null fallen, glaub ich wiederum nicht. FnF bleiben "alternativlos", weil sonst mit anderen Experimenten der US-Hausmarkt gefährdet werden könnte. Solange die Firmen Gewinne machen, bleiben die Stammaktien erhalten, werden allerdings weiterhin von der Zwangsverwaltung "geknebelt". Der Regierung könnte die Gefangenschaft mit Pech noch ein paar Jahre fortsetzen.
Endlos Zeit hat sie allerdings nicht: Falls in 3,5 Jahren die Republikaner die Präs-Wahl gewinnen, könnte der neue Rep-Präsident sofort Bidens Calabria-NachfolgerIn entlassen und dann tatsächlich in den kommenden vier Jahren die Freilassung durchbringen - und zwar zu Konditionen, die den Reps gefallen, nicht aber den Dems. Dies setzt die Dems bereits jetzt unter Handlungszwang.
Ob und wann die Regierung die SPS löscht und zu welchen Bedingungen, steht in den Sternen. Bis dahin bleiben die JPS "totes Kapital" (ohne Dividende).
Außerdem hat Scotus viele Hedgefonds mit JPS und Stammaktien auf dem falschen Fuß erwischt - vermutlich gewollt. Die meisten HF halten JPS. Der Kursdruck ist bei den 34-JPS-Tranchen auch deshalb besonders stark, weil sie alle handelseng sind.
Die Regierung dürfte die SPS nur löschen, wenn sie dafür etwas anderes als "Entschädigung" hereinbekommt. Tim Howard meint (womöglich etwas blauäugig), dass als Grund schon ausreichend sei, dass die Regierung mit der Freilassung von FnF "affordable housing" (günstige Hypotheken für sozial schlechter Gestellte) stärker fördern kann, denn nach einer Freilassung könnten FnF mehr Aktivität entfalten, zumal Bremser Calabria nun weg ist.
Andere Kommentatoren hingegen befürchten, dass dies allein nicht ausreicht. Die Regierung könnte als "Entschädigung" für den SPS-Verzicht z. B. die Warrants ausüben, was den Kurs der Stammaktien um 80 % verwässert.
Schlimmstenfalls wandelt die Reigerung auch die SPS in Stammaktien um, was dann 99 % Verwässerung entspricht und den Kurs der Stammaktien auf wenige Cents drücken würde.
Der Kursdruck ist bei den 37-JPS-Tranchen auch deshalb besonders stark, weil sie alle handelseng sind.
(Ich habe noch einmal nachgezählt, es gibt 37 JPS-Tranchen, die meistern von Freddie Mac)
https://www.ariva.de/forum/...ohne-ende-370497?page=1638#jumppos40956
Tatsächlich würde der Kurs aber wohl stark steigen, weil die SPS dann weg sind (in Stammaktien geswappt) und die JPS dann die ranghöchste Securities im Capital Stack wären. Womöglich sind die JPS ab dann auch wieder Div-berechtigt.
Unklar ist, in welcher Reihenfolge die Aktionen laufen. Wenn die Warrants ausgeübt würden, wäre das vermutlich die erste Transaktion.
Am wahrscheinlichsten ist mMn, dass "Alles gleichzeitig" passiert, also Warrantsausübung, beide Swaps samt SPS-Löschung, Freilassung, KE-Ankündigung.
Es könnte sein, dass die (Collins-)Kläger bereits in nächster Zeit mit der Regierung einen solchen Vergleich aushandeln. Damit rechnet z. B. Michael Koo (# 435, erster Tweet). Für die Regierung wäre das vorteilhaft, weil sie bei den aktuellen Kursrückgängen eine gute Verhandlungsposition hat.
Meines Erachtens ist es dann sogar gerade das wahrscheinlichste Szenario, dass im Zuge dieser beispiellosen Kapitalerhöhung "alle" preferred stocks in Stammaktien umgewandelt würden. ...aber diese Einschätzung von mir kennst Du dann ja bereits.
Dass es nichts bringt, sich die Aussichten schöner zu reden, als sie tatsächlich sind, hätte man bis dahin dann vielleicht immerhin doch aus der Sache lernen können.
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Wie kommst du darauf, dass ich etwas anderes erwarten würde?
Obwohl Fannie und Freddie nie wirklich pleite waren, wurde die Pleite durch 2008 durch Bilanzmanipulation herbeigeführt, damit FnF zum Subprime-Mülleimer der US-Zockerbanken werden konnten. Das war der Masterplan von Finanzminister Hank Paulson (ex Goldman).
Die US-Politiker und die US-Justiz sind offenbar bereit, diese Lüge bis zum bitteren Ende aufrecht zu erhalten. Tim Howard (ex CFO von Fannie) sagt, es kann heute nicht mehr schlüssig bewiesen werden, ob die Pleite damals getürkt war oder nicht. Weil es den Politikern gut in den Kram passt, wird das Pleite-Narrativ daher weiter gepflegt und bedient.
Deshalb wird die weitere Abwicklung voraussichtlich so laufen wie bei anderen Restrukturierungen, z. B. bei General Motors. Dort wurden die Aktien erst auf OTC geschickt und am Ende wertlos ausgebucht. Die neuen Aktionäre (der Börsengang erfolgte zwei Jahre nach der Pleite) wurden die Halter vorrangiger Anleihen. Es gab den typischen Debt-to-Equity-Swap.
Bei Fannie und Freddie gibt es keine Anleihen (außer den MBS, aber die dienen nicht zur Refinanzierung der beiden Firmen). Deshalb werden mMn die JPS diese Rolle übernehmen. Sie sind nach den SPS (die beim Swap verschwinden) die ranghöchsten Securities im Capital Stack. Die JPS werden in die neuen Aktien geswappt, genau wie bei GM (und keinesfalls, wie Zanoni meint, 1 zu 1 in die Altaktien).