Ambac Rocky Balboa oder chapter 11

sell on good news  

Ich hoffe, dass die aktuelle Kurs entwicklung nachhaltig sein soll. Dafür brauchen wir noch einige gute Nachrichten

Wenn wir ab nächste woche von WikiLeaks etwas hören würde, wäre für uns super.

http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/01/ambac-accues-jp-morgan-of-fraud-in-ongoing-mortgage-suit.html

So it is gratifying in a perverse way to see a case in which the perp  not only looks to have engaged in chicanery, but the facts make it  pretty hard for him to say he didn’t know he was pulling a fast one. And  even more fun, it involves JP Morgan, which has somehow managed to  create the impression that it was better than all the other TARP banks,  when on the mortgage front, there is plenty evidence to suggest that all  the major banks have been up to their eyeballs in bad practices.

The case involves the bond insurer Ambac and the mortgage company  EMC, which was the Bear Stearns conduit for buying mortgages to  securitize and now thus part of JP Morgan. In 2010, reports surfaced  that EMC had been falsifying mortgage data to keep its pipeline moving as fast as Bear wanted and contain costs.

But a suit by bond insurer Ambac alleges far more serious  misbehavior. The discovery process in outstanding putback litigation has  unearthed a scheme to defraud investors and Ambac and led the bond  insurer to add fraud charges to its complaint. The Atlantic, which broke  the 2010 story, gives a good overview:

According to the lawsuit, the Bear traders would sell  toxic mortgage securities to investors and then sell back the bad loans  with early payment defaults to the banks that originated them at a  discount. The traders would pocket the refund, and would not pass it on  to the mortgage trust, which was where it should have gone to be  distributed to the investors who owned the bonds. The [Tom] Marano-led  traders [Marano was  Senior Managing Director and Global Head of  Mortgages for Bear and is now CEO of Ally's mortgage operations] also  cut the time allowed for early payment defaults, without telling the  bond investors. That way, Bear could quickly securitize defective loans,  without leaving enough time for investors to do their own due diligence  after the bonds were sold and put-back any bad loans to Bear.

The traders were essentially double-dipping — getting paid twice on  the deal. How was this possible? Once the security was sold, they didn’t  have a legal claim to get cash back from the bad loans — that claim  belonged to bond investors — but they did so anyway and kept the money.  Thus, Bear was cheating the investors they promised to have sold a safe  product out of their cash. According to former Bear Stearns and EMC  traders and analysts who spoke with The Atlantic, [Mike] Nierenberg  [head of the adjustable-rate mortgage trading desk] and [Jeff]  Verschleiser [another senior managing director on the same desk] were  the decision-makers for the double dipping scheme, and thus, are named  as individual defendants in the suit.

 

    This evidence – obtained for the first time through discovery – demonstrates that at the same time that JP Morgan and EMC were touting to Ambac the quality of the Mortgage Loans and the rigorous procedures for verifying their quality, JP Morgan personnel understood that the loans underlying the transactions were in fact – to use one JP Morgan employee’s unequivocal if impolite words – a “sack of shit.”

FTAlphaville recounts how JP Morgan continued to rebuff putback claims, even when EMC found them to be legitimate:

    Ambac says JPM barred Bear from fulfilling repurchase requests right after it snapped up in 2008. In doing so, a JPM executive director also went against a review by EMC, it is claimed, that said more than half of a set of loans were in breach of reps and warranties. That, Ambac says, enabled the exec to eliminate up to $14m in JPM liabilities and reduce accounting reserves for the loans by almost 50 per cent.

So it will be rather difficult for JP Morgan to claim it has clean hands on this one and merely picked up an outstanding mess when it bought Bear.

This suit is at a minimum a black eye for JP Morgan, which fought tooth and nail to keep it sealed, and may embolden other litigants, like the investors in Bear’s deals. But sadly, it also demonstrates that crime does pay. The executives named in this case as being at the heart of this scheme now run the mortgage businesses at Ally, JP Morgan, and Goldman.

--------------------------------------------------

über klage Punkten

http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2011/01/25/468916/a-very-messy-ambac-lawsuit-for-jpmorgan/

A very messy Ambac lawsuit for JPMorgan

Posted by Tracy Alloway on Jan 25 17:43.  

JPMorgan didn’t want this to be made public. You can kind of see why.

Quick background — the bank has been engaged in a legal battle with  Ambac since November 2008. The monoline says EMC, Bear Stearns old  mortgage-banking arm, misrepresented certain securitised loans that  Ambac insured. The lawsuit’s been going back and forth for ages but this  month a new court doc was made public.

Ambac wants to amend its complaint to include a fraud charge.

From one of the court filings:

The parties have engaged in extensive discovery, which  has included millions of pages of documents and more than a dozen  depositions. Materials produced in discovery have confirmed that EMC’s  representations about the Mortgage Loans are false, but have also  revealed that EMC and its affiliates, including JP Morgan, knew that  those representations were false and knowingly made numerous, material  false statements and omitted material information in pre-contractual  communications in order to induce Ambac to issue the Policies. This  evidence – obtained for the first time through discovery – demonstrates  that at the same time that JP Morgan and EMC were touting to Ambac the  quality of the Mortgage Loans and the rigorous procedures for verifying  their quality, JP Morgan personnel understood that the loans underlying  the transactions were in fact – to use one JP Morgan employee’s  unequivocal if impolite words – a “sack of shit.”

Hold that (rather repulsive) thought.

Because there’s another EMC/Bear/JPM lawsuit floating around too.  According to Ambac, Bear tried to force a mortgage originator to buy  back faulty loans it had insured with another monoline, Syncora. At the same time, Ambac says, that Bear was refusing repurchase requests by Syncora. Syncora is also suing EMC.

Back to the Ambac complaint:

It is true that the proposed Amended Complaint references  JP Morgan’s similar scam with respect to Syncora, another monoline  insurer similarly situated to Ambac in a deal involving mortgage loans  of similar type and vintage that were originated by one of the largest  originators of loans in the Transactions at issue here. (P.A.C. ¶ 212.)  That evidence is directly relevant to this case insofar as it is strong  evidence of Defendants’ pattern of fraudulently depriving insurers, like  Ambac, of their rights. In addition, and contrary to Judge  Katz’s holding, the proposed Amended Complaint does not simply rely upon  the Syncora allegations; it also specifically identifies particular  loans in these Transactions for which JP Morgan rebuffed Ambac’s  repurchase request, even though EMC had previously demanded that the  originator repurchase the exact same loan because of the exact same  defects raised by Ambac. (P.A.C. ¶¶ 293-296.) In particular,  EMC has produced in discovery databases of the loans at issue in these  Transactions, which confirm that EMC itself put back hundreds of loans  to originators, complaining about the same breaches in those loans that  EMC rejected when Ambac put back the same loans based on the same  breaches. (P.A.C. ¶¶ 293, 296.)

It gets worse from here.

Ambac says JPM barred Bear from fulfilling repurchase requests right  after it snapped up in 2008. In doing so, a JPM executive director also  went against a review by EMC, it is claimed, that said more  than half of a set of loans were in breach of reps and warranties. That,  Ambac says, enabled the exec to eliminate up to $14m in JPM liabilities  and reduce accounting reserves for the loans by almost 50 per cent.

Then there’s the whole double-dipping thing:

Bear Stearns executed a scheme to double its recovery on the defective loans. Thus,  when the defective loans it purchased and then sold into  securitizations stopped performing during the EPD period, Bear Stearns  confidentiality (i) made claims against the suppliers from which it  purchased the loans (i.e., the “originators” of these loans) for the  amount due on the loans, (ii) settled the claims at deep discounts,  (iii) pocketed the recoveries and (iv) left the defective loans in the  securitizations.  Bear Stearns did not tell the securitization  participates that it made and settled claims against the suppliers.

And the threatening of rating agencies:

By mid-2007, the rating agencies had become increasingly  concerned with the accuracy of the disclosures made by Bear Stearns  regarding its mortgage-backed securities. The reaction by Defendant  Marano was immediate and indignant at the gall of the rating agencies to  contravene Bear Stearns. In no uncertain terms, he directed his staff  to cut off all fees due to the rating agencies:

• “My intention is to contact my peer at each firm as well as the  investors who bought the deals. From there, we are going to demand a  waiver of fees. In the interim, do not pay a single fee to either rating agency. Hold every fee up.”

And the, erm, shorting of banks exposed to Ambac:

Knowing that its fraudulent and breaching conduct  was resulting and would result in grave harm to Ambac, Bear Stearns  then implemented a trading strategy to profit from Ambac’s potential  demise by “shorting” banks with large exposure to Ambac-insured  securities.  (The “shorts” were bets the banks’ shares or holdings would  decrease in value as Ambac incurred additional harm.) In late  2007, Bear Stearns Senior Managing Director Jeffrey Verschleiser  boasted that “[a]t the end of October, while presenting to the risk  committee on our business I told them that a few financial guarantors  were vulnerable to potential write downs in the CDO and MBS market and  we should be short a multiple of 10 of the shorts I had put on … In less  than three weeks we made approximately $55 million on just these two  trades.” Bolstered by this success, Bear Stearns carried this trading  strategy into 2008.

A federal judge will need to rule on whether Ambac’s amended complaint can go forward.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

die amis werden die richtung vorgeben, die umsätze bei uns sind noch relativ unwichtig...  

Nicht vergessen!

-Moodys kann grosse Wahrscheinlichkeit nach der Bestätigun von Reh. Prozess die Rating von ACC und Ambac erhöhen.

es wird auch positive Entwicklung für den aktuellen Kurs sein

 

 

'It's a gigantic step forward because the rehabilitation of the insurance company is what creates value for the debtor in Chapter 11,' said Martin Bienenstock, of the law firm Dewey&LeBoeuf, which is representing Ambac Financial Group in bankruptcy. The insurance commissioner had warned that if the plan were not approved, the municipal bond policies might have to be included in the rehabilitation as well, or the business might even face liquidation.

 

wo kommen die denn alle her? die vielen namen tz tz ;)  

zweieinhalb tage hoch.
also wird es gleich erst einen kleinen rücksetzer geben um anschließend 50 bis 100% hoch zu steigen.
so läuft es oft bei den amis,mal sehen ob es hier und heute genauso passt.

meine meinung  

 

Wo gibt es den Link zu den Amis?  

so wie es aussieht ziehen die amis mit und schöpfen nicht stupid german money
siehe rt kurs
viel glück  

http://www.otcmarkets.com/stock/ABKFQ/quote  

http://www.world-of-stocks.com/rt_data/abk  

und gleich weiter richtung 0,30 $  

als frischling, da abk gerne auch wieder abgibt,
fannie macht es gerade vor  

 ...kommt gleich die nächste Rakete bis auf 0,29$!

Es liegt in der Luft...ggf erst nach 20 Uhr...

 

Kontraindikator?  

 

oder noch warten.rebound müsste mindestens pro tag entstehen.....  

 

 ich voreilig?! Warten wir mal ab...

 

Bei CIT wurde sehr offen über die Ausbuchung der Aktien geredet. Wie ist das bei abk? Ich habe keine großen Nachrichten gefunden. BF/Malboroman erwähnte mal, dass die Pensionskassen aus Aktien besteht und sie deswegen zuschauen werden, dass die Aktien bestehen bleiben.
Dazu gabs noch ein Beitrag, wo drin stand, dass ein Aktionär (Friedberg) mit  bei den Köpfen sitzt um die Aktionäre zu schützen. Ist das wirklich so?

Was steht noch im Moment aus um aus CH11 zu kommen?
Das urteil zu den 700Mio?
Die Klagen?

---
The RMBS policyholders group responded that the unit "is a valuable asset only if value can be upstreamed from [the unit] to AFG at some point in time. ... [A]ll policyholders of Ambac should benefit from the preserved value of Ambac's restructuring before Ambac's pre-existing shareholder receives a single penny. There is no legal or equitable justification for Ambac's pre-existing shareholder to retain its ownership of Ambac, or any benefit from the rehabilitation."  

http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/bankrupt.htm  

" Die Zahl der Neubauverkäufe in den USA war im Dezember sprunghaft um 17,5% gestiegen, während Volkswirte ein Plus von nur 3,1% prongostiziert hatten."  

http://www.ambac.com/press/111010.html

The suspended NYSE securities include:

   * Common Stock, $0.01 per share (NYSE ticker symbol: ABK);
   * 5.875% Debentures, due March 24, 2103 (NYSE ticker symbol: AKT);
   * 5.95% Debentures, due February 28, 2103 (NYSE ticker symbol: AKF); and
   * 9.50% Equity Units, due February 15, 2021 (NYSE ticker symbol: ABK PRZ).

As a result of the suspension, the Company’s common stock and the shares of its equity units began trading exclusively on the OTC market on November 9, 2010. On the OTC market, shares of the Company’s common stock, which previously traded on the NYSE under the symbol ABK, trade under the symbol ABKFQ. Shares of the Company’s equity units, which previously traded on the NYSE under the symbol ABK-PRZ, trade under the symbol ABKOQ.

http://www.ambac.com/press/111010.html